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Nonrecourse Debt Revisited,
Restructured and Redefined
LINDA SUGIN*
I. INTRODUCTION
As the popularity of nonrecourse debt has risen and fallen in re-
sponse to both market forces and opportunities offered by the tax law
for its exploitation, the tax treatment of nonrecourse debt has
changed, but in a remarkably haphazard way. Although the courts
have struggled to define the tax nature of nonrecourse debt since the
1940's, Congress stood by passively for three decades, finally entering
the fray only when tax avoidance had become so widespread that the
courts were unable to control it. Making matters worse, each time
they addressed the issue, Congress and the courts did so narrowly,
limiting their responses to the exigencies of the day. They treated
only the particular symptoms they observed without curing the under-
lying problem. As a result, the law today is inconsistent and overly
complex; each new use of nonrecourse debt produced new questions,
whose resolutions were layered upon prior inadequate answers. Yet,
despite numerous opportunities to revisit the issue, neither Congress
nor the judiciary has ever sought to rebuild the foundation upon
which all later constructions rest.
This Article suggests that the foundation for the tax treatment of
nonrecourse debt under current law-the true debt approach-is un-
workable. It does not reflect economic reality or correctly measure
income. It leads to bizarre and unpredictable consequences, and in-
vites abuse, such as inflated seller financing and deduction shifting
from low bracket to high bracket taxpayers. Much has been written
about the role of nonrecourse debt in making abusive tax shelters
profitable,1 and while abusive tax shelters no longer abound as they
* Associate Professor, Fordham University School of Law. I am very grateful to No~l
Cunningham, Jill Fisch, Constantine Katsoris, Deborah Schenk, Leo Schmolka and Steve
Thel for their helpful comments, Allison Levey for her research assistance and Fordham
University School of Law for its generous support.
1 See, e.g., Boris L Bittker, Tax Shelters, Nonrecourse Debt, and the Crane Case, 33 Tax
L. Rev. 277 (1978); Calvin H. Johnson, Tax Shelter Gain: The Mismatch of Debt and
Supply Side Depreciation, 61 Tex. L. Rev. 1013 (1983); Daniel N. Shaviro, Risk and Ac-
crual: The Tax Treatment of Nonrecourse Debt, 44 Tax L. Rev. 401 (1989) [hereinafter
Risk and Accrual].
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once did, nonrecourse debt continues to pose serious problems, even
in the post-Tax Reform Act of 19862 era. If inflated seller financing
were the only problem, nonrecourse debt would no longer be an is-
sue.3 This Article argues that nonrecourse debt is not simply a tax
shelter problem.
Restructurings are the nonrecourse debt disaster for the 1990's.
This Article describes the tax consequences of restructuring under-
secured nonrecourse debt to illustrate the continuing difficulties of the
traditional approach to nonrecourse debt. It is one example that indi-
cates that the vexatious tax treatment of nonrecourse debt is persis-
tent, and suggests that future decades might suffer yet unknown
hardship if nonrecourse debt continues to be treated as an uncondi-
tional obligation to pay. The issues arising from the workout of trou-
bled nonrecourse debt bear little resemblance to those posed by the
shelters for doctors and lawyers popular in the 1980's, but because the
tax treatment of nonrecourse debt fails to reflect the economic bar-
gain that such debt strikes, they create problems for taxpayers and
administrators today. Perhaps the restructurings dilemma finally will
convince Congress that addressing the manifestations of nonrecourse
debt-with legislation such as §§ 465 and 469-is insufficient, and that
the traditional approach to nonrecourse debt is essentially flawed and
therefore will be a continuing source of confusion, if not tax
avoidance.
This Article concludes that restructurings present a tax crisis for
debtors holding property mortgaged for more than its value 4 because
current law requires such debtors to cede ownership for tax purposes
or report cancellation of indebtedness income.5 To date, no rulings or
cases analyze the restructuring of excessive nonrecourse debt in the
circumstances described in this Article. This vacuum is not surprising
because taxpayers have no incentive to bring this issue to the govern-
ment's attention and the government has insufficient information to
2 Pub. L. No. 99-514, 100 Stat. 2085.
3 See Calvin H. Johnson, The Front End of the Crane Rule, 47 Tax Notes 593 (Apr. 30,
1990) [hereinafter Front End]; Shaviro, Risk and Accrual, note 1, at 432-42; Theodore S.
Sims, Debt, Accelerated Depreciation, and the Tale of a Teakettle: Tax Shelter Abuse
Reconsidered, 42 UCLA L. Rev. 263,325-32 (1994) (all discussing abuse nonrecourse debt
allows by encouraging inflated seller financing).
Throughout this Article, I intend references to tax shelters to be in the colloquial sense,
implying transactions entered into with the primary purpose of sheltering income produced
by other activities from taxation, and not transactions described in IRC § 6111(c).
4 Throughout this Article, "value" is used to mean "fair market value," which, in its
classic formulation, and for all purposes of the Code, is defined by § 20.2031-1(b) of the
regulations as "the price at which the property would change hands between a willing
buyer and a willing seller, neither being under any compulsion to buy or to sell and both
having reasonable knowledge of relevant facts."
5 See Section II.
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identify undersecured restructured debt. This Article explains that
under current law, debt restructurings that allow nonrecourse debt to
remain undersecured would be treated as foreclosures, that is, as
transfers of property. Such treatment discourages restructurings that
would be beneficial for both borrowers and lenders and creates a trap
for the unwary.
This result arises from the flawed current treatment of nonrecourse
debt, which treats the debt as a true obligation to pay. Alternatives to
the traditional true-debt approach to nonrecourse debt would im-
prove income measurement. Some would require more revolutionary
changes in the law than others. This Article takes no position on the
wisdom of the realization rule, and supports an approach that fits
within the current realization-based system. It recommends redefin-
ing nonrecourse debt as an investment by the lender in the securing
property, rather than as part of the borrower's current cost of the
property.6
More specifically, I propose a system in which nonrecourse debt se-
cured by depreciable property essentially is treated as a depreciable
asset held by the lender, unlike other debt obligations which, under
current law, are presumed not to waste by virtue of the repayment of
principal. I suggest that the borrower and lender share depreciation
deductions, relative to investment, on a temporal basis. Under this
approach, the borrower and lender each would be entitled to depreci-
ation deductions equal to the cash and recourse debt7 that each in-
vested in the property. The borrower would be entitled to depreciate
her investment first whenever it is subordinated to the lender's invest-
ment. Although this approach would require that lenders and bor-
rowers keep running tallies of their respective investments in
property, it also would simplify a complex body of law developed in
response to the tax shelter phenomenon. These changes would be
consistent with the c6ncept of basis as investment in property, and
thereby square with the cost recovery function of the Code's allow-
6 The Supreme Court considered this approach in Tufts, but rejected it because it would
have meant overturning the approach taken in Crane, which the Court apparently was
unwilling to do. See Commissioner v. Tufts, 461 U.S. 300, 308 n.6 (1983) (citing Diane M.
Anderson, Note, Federal Income Tax Treatment of Nonrecourse Debt, 82 Colum. L Rev.
1498, 1514 (1982)); see also Crane v. Commissioner, 331 U.S. 1, 10-11 (1946) (concluding
that basis for depreciation "is the value of the property, undiminished by mortgages
thereon").
7 This proposal is grounded in the observation that nonrecourse debt is more like an
investment in property than an obligation of a borrower, and therefore should be treated
as an equity investment rather than true debt. While there are differences between re-
course debt and cash invested in property, those differences are not based on the subject of
the investment, and, therefore, this Article takes no position with regard to recourse debt.
Rather, it starts from the assumption that recourse debt is treated like cash for purposes of
basis assignment.
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ance for depreciation. It also would fit well with the other purpose of
depreciation allowances, namely, to reflect the decline in value of
property, by allocating deductions to the party who would suffer a loss
if such deductions accurately measured the decline in the property's
value. The proposal is intended to inform a way of thinking about
nonrecourse debt, basis and depreciation without abandoning the re-
alization requirement and without resolving every issue that a change
in the approach to nonrecourse debt eventually could warrant.
Section II briefly reviews the history of the treatment of nonre-
course acquisition debt, and presents an example of a current chal-
lenge in the evolution of the law, real estate restructuring. Section III
analyzes the restructuring under current law, asking the question that
remains open: What happens to the basis in the property in the re-
structuring of an undersecured nonrecourse debt? It concludes that
current law would treat a restructuring as a transfer of securing prop-
erty to the lender in satisfaction of the debt whenever the value of the
securing property is less than the outstanding amount of the debt after
the restructuring. Section IV explains how the realization require-
ment forces the issue on a restructuring and considers whether manip-
ulation of the realization event for the property would be a better
solution to the restructuring problem than revising the basic approach
to nonrecourse debt would be. Section V discusses why the true-debt
approach is unacceptable, both in a restructuring and elsewhere. Sec-
tion VI describes the debt as an investment and a temporal deprecia-
tion allocation approach, and demonstrates how this approach would
work in practice.
II. DEVELOPMENT OF THE LAW
A. Crane v. Commissioner
Crane v. Commissioner,8 decided at a time when nonrecourse debt
was not widely used, laid the foundation for the tax treatment of non-
recourse debt. The petitioner inherited a building subject to a mort-
gage, for which she never had any personal liability. At the time of
the decedent's death, the building had a value equal to the encum-
brance.9 The Supreme Court determined that Crane's basis in the
building at the time of the inheritance, under a predecessor to § 1014,
was the value of the building undiminished by the mortgage. 10 It also
held that on Crane's sale of the building, her amount realized included
both the cash she received and the debt to which the property was
8 331 U.S. 1 (1947).
9 See id. at 3.
10 See id. at 6-11.
Imaged with the Permission of N.Y.U. Tax Law Review
[Vol. 51:
HeinOnline  -- 51 Tax. L. Rev. 118 1995-1996
NONRECOURSE DEBT
then subject." The critical legacy of Crane is the true-debt approach:
A nonrecourse mortgage is treated like a recourse mortgage and,
therefore, is included both in the taxpayer's basis on acquisition and in
the amount realized on disposition of the property.
One of the Court's primary concerns in reaching its conclusion
about basis was administrative. Because basis determines the depreci-
ation deductions allowed on the property, the Court avoided the "tre-
mendous accounting burden on both the Commissioner and the
taxpayer" of an annually shifting basis.U If the taxpayer were allowed
basis only to the extent of principal payments on the obligation, her
basis would increase as the payments were made. To avoid this prob-
lem,13 the Court instead chose to treat the taxpayer as though she al-
ready had satisfied the entire mortgage. The Court thus created a tidy
rule that allowed all depreciation deductions to be taken by one, and
only one person-the owner-obligor.14
The Crane case was an easy one in which to conclude that basis
should include the secured debt because the Court found that the en-
cumbrance never exceeded the value of the property, and the nonre-
course debt, therefore, was, in fact, indistinguishable from recourse
debt.15 It left open the question of whether a taxpayer should be enti-
tled to depreciation deductions attributable to basis predicated upon
nonrecourse debt in excess of the value of the securing property. 16
11 See id. at 13-14.
12 Id. at 10.
13 The Court also was troubled by the mismatch of income and related cost that would
occur if the property economically depreciated more rapidly than the debt vas amortized,
presumably because the Court believed that only the borrower-owner could claim depreci-
ation deductions. See id. at 10-11.
14 The virtue in assigning all depreciation deductions to one party is unclear, perhaps its
simplicity is appealing. Nevertheless, it would be possible for all the property's deprecia-
tion deductions to be utilized without assigning them solely to the owner-obligor. See Noal
B. Cunningham & Deborah H. Schenk, Taxation Without Realization: A "Revolutionary"
Approach to Ownership, 47 Tax L. Rev. 725, 751-74 (1992) (proposing that tax law recog-
nize multiple interests, such as income and remainder interests in a single property, in
order to tax the income from property more accurately); Anderson, note 6; Section V.
15 See, e.g., United States v. Hendler, 303 U.S. 564 (1938) (including debt for which
purchaser is personally liable in cost basis); Brons Hotels, Inc. v. Commissioner, 34 B.T.A.
376 (1936) (same).
16 "Whatever may be the rule as to allowing depreciation to a mortgagor on property in
his possession which is subject to an unassumed mortgage and clearly worth less than the
lien, we are not faced with that problem and see no reason to decide it now." Crane, 331
U.S. at 12. This language is broad enough to apply to property held in a declining market
as well as property purchased subject to nonrecourse debt. Crane predated tax shelters
based on nonrecourse debt and accelerated depreciation, and it is therefore significant that
the Court recognized this issue as a matter of legal interpretation.
The issue of depreciation attributable to nonrecourse debt that is excessive upon acquisi-
tion finally was determined in 1976, when the Ninth Circuit decided that inflated acquisi-
tion debt does not support basis. See Estate of Franklin v. Commissioner, 544 F2d 1045
(9th Cir. 1976). The Ninth Circuit did not resolve the entire depreciation question because
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A close reading of Crane makes clear that the Court deliberately
left open the possibility that a debtor, who correctly enjoys deprecia-
tion deductions on the acquisition of property because its value sug-
gests that the debt will be treated as a personal liability, thereafter
might be denied depreciation deductions as soon as the value of the
property fell below the outstanding debt.17 This issue has never been
resolved because, prior to being raised by the restructuring of nonre-
course debt, the realization requirement relegated it to the theoretical
realm.18 Without a realization event, or at least a revaluation implicit
in a default, the owner's rights and obligations with respect to prop-
erty, and the value of the property, ordinarily are not redetermined
periodically. Therefore, without a restructuring, there is no occasion
to raise the issue of whether depreciation claimed in the ordinary
course is excessive in relation to the property's value.
B. Beyond Crane
1. Estate of Franklin: Curtailing Basis Abuses
The premise of Crane-that nonrecourse debt is equivalent to re-
course debt-fostered the proliferation of inflated nonrecourse acqui-
sition debt and inspired tax avoidance schemes in seller-financed
transactions,' 9 which were slowed finally by the Ninth Circuit's Frank-
lin2o decision. In that case, a group of doctors entered into a pur-
ported sale-leaseback arrangement with the owners and operators of a
motel.21 The doctors "paid" a price greatly in excess of the value of
the motel, and under Crane's true-debt rule,22 used that amount as
their basis for determining depredation. The Tax Court held that the
doctors had acquired nothing more than an option to purchase the
Franklin did not involve property worth more than the related debt at the outset that later
declined to a value less than the debt. This case is discussed in Sections II.D. and III.
17 See Crane. 331 U.S. at 12; see Section HI.D.
18 See Section III.
19 See Bittker, note 1, at 283 ("By holding that nonrecourse liabilities are includable in
the taxpayer's basis for property, Crane laid the foundation stone of most tax shelters
... ."). Professor Bittker took a jab at the Service by proposing an essay contest for its
staff attorneys on their "pyrrhic victories."
20 Estate of Franklin v. Commissioner, 544 F.2d 1045 (9th Cir. 1976).
21 The doctors "purchased" the motel for approximately twice its value and leased it
back for rental payments that exactly matched the mortgage payments due to them from
the doctors. See id. at 1047, 1048 n.4. The Tax Court made no finding as to the value of the
motel, stating that the value of the property could not be determined on the record before
it. Estate of Franklin v. Commissioner, 64 T.C. 752, 767-68 (1975). The Ninth Circuit in-
terpreted this as the taxpayer's fatal failure of proof. 544 F.2d at 1048. A small amount of
"prepaid interest" compensated the seller-operators for their trouble, but, otherwise, no
money changed hands. Id. at 1047.
22 See Tifts v. Commissioner, 461 U.S. 300, 313 (1983) ("Crane also stands for the
broader proposition, however, that a nonrecourse loan should be treated as a true loan.").
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motel when the mortgage came due.23 The Ninth Circuit agreed with
the Tax Court that the doctors were not entitled to depreciation de-
ductions attributable to the inflated debt, but, rather than characteriz-
ing the transaction as an option (or anything else), simply reasoned
that no sale had taken place. The inflated debt, therefore, was not a
true "obligation" of the borrowers.24
The Ninth Circuit refused to include the debt in basis because the
doctors failed to prove that it represented an investment in the prop-
erty. The debtors had no incentive to pay the debt, for they would
gain no equity in the property until after one-half the obligation had
been paid. The court observed that the arrangement constituted a
"mere chance that a genuine debt obligation [might] arise."2s
Since the Franklin court found that the purported obligation was
not a debt at all, one can argue for reconciliation of Franklin with the
Crane rule,26 even though, most simply, the latter rule stands for the
inclusion of acquisition debt, whether recourse or nonrecourse, in ba-
sis. The debt in Franklin was simply not of the same species as the
debt in Crane. Because Crane's assumption that the debtor would
treat the nonrecourse debt as though it were recourse did not apply to
the doctors, the Franklin court sidestepped the issue of whether that
general assumption about nonrecourse debt was warranted. Without
defining the parameters, the Franklin court somewhat limited the
Crane rule.
Nevertheless, if the rationale behind the Crane rule depended
partly on administrative concerns (as the opinion suggests), Franklin
undercuts that purpose. The major strength of Crane was that it pro-
vided a bright line rule that was easy to apply. Franklin destroyed that
elegant simplicity by departing from the tidiness of giving all purchas-
ers advance basis credit for purchase money debt and by requiring
inquiry into the bona fides of a purported debt obligation. Franklin
separated the sham from the valid by establishing a general rule
whereby the debtor must prove the value of the property at the incep-
tion of the debt.27
2 See Franklin, 64 T.C. at 762.
24 See Franklin, 544 F.2d at 1049.
2S Id.
2 Professor Andrews believes that there is a value limitation inherent in Crane. See
William D. Andrews, On Beyond Tufts, 61 Taxes 949, 959 (1983).
27 The opinion in Franklin is notable for failing to chastise the taxpayers for engaging in
a tax avoidance scheme. See Section I.B. (discussing general applicability of Franklin
principle).
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2. Purchase Without Investment
Franklin changed the focus of the issues raised in Crane from the
question of what constitutes the property to what constitutes the pur-
chaser's investment in that property. This shift to the question of in-
vestment is crucial for the assignment of depreciation deductions.
Where there is seller-financing, as in Franklin, a determination that
the purchaser has made no investment in the property means, ipso
facto, that the "seller" must continue to own the property after the
"sale." This conclusion is consistent with the Crane court's interest in
having the depreciation deductions assigned to one and only one
person.
A harder case for identifying the owner is presented when the pur-
chaser makes no investment in the property, and the seller has
divested himself of all interest, such as when a purchaser receives
100% nonrecourse financing from a third party lender. Then, applica-
tion of Franklin to nonrecourse debt creates a dilemma because there
is no logical choice for assignment of depreciation deductions attribu-
table to the property: If the lender is not the owner, who is? No other
plausible candidate appears.2s Courts have avoided the problem of
identifying the proper taxpayer in Franklin-type deals by concluding
(or the Service conceding) that a sale has taken place, and treating the
purchaser as the owner of the property for tax purposes. Neverthe-
less, the depreciation allowed to such purchasers has been tied to the
Franklin determination, 29 denying basis for excessive nonrecourse
debt.30 While this approach identifies the taxpayer entitled to claim
depreciation deductions, it does not necessarily allow anyone the full
amount of depreciation that the property would have supported.3'
28 The restructuring situation presents this issue at a later stage in the holding period of
the property, as does the acquisition of property subject to a pre-existing lien in excess of
the value of the property. This is the position of the purchaser in the transaction at issue in
Tufts v. Commissioner, 461 U.S. 300, 303 (1983). For a suggestion that the acquiror should
be entitled to basis at least equal to the value of the property, see Andrews, note 26, at 953;
Erik M. Jensen, The Unanswered Question in Tufts: What Was the Purchaser's Basis?, 10
Va. Tax Rev. 455, 500 (1991). For the counterargument, see Calvin Johnson, Play Money
Basis: When is Nonrecourse Liability a Valid Cost?, 11 Va. Tax Rev. 631 (1992); Calvin H.
Johnson, The Liability Was Also Not a Cost to Bayles, 11 Va. Tax Rev. 651 (1992).
29 See, e.g., Estate of Isaacson v. Commissioner, 860 F.2d 55 (2d Cir. 1988); Odend'hal v.
Commissioner, 748 F.2d 908 (4th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1143 (1985); Thompson
v. Commissioner, 631 F.2d 642, 647 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 961 (1981);
Zirker v. Commissioner, 87 T.C. 970, 976-77 (1986).
30 In post-Franklin deals, the Service and the courts applied the Franklin principle to
transactions respected as sales by comparing the value of the purchased property with the
outstanding amount of the debt. See, e.g., Brannen v. Commissioner, 722 F.2d 695,701 n.3
(11th Cir. 1984); Rev. Rul. 81-278, 1981-2 C.B. 159; Rev. Rul. 77-110, 1977-1 C.B. 58.
31 For example, where the downpayment is less than the value of the property, but the
nonrecourse debt alone is greater than that value, the purchaser's depreciation is limited to
the downpayment. One possible solution to the problem of purchase without investment is
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C. Congressional Response
The Franklin approach, attacking nonrecourse debt on a case-by-
case basis, was inadequate to stop all attempts at overvaluation and
the resulting deduction creation and shifting.32 When Congress finally
stepped in, the field had been left to the courts' and the Commis-
sioner's case-by-case determinations for more than 30 years. By that
time, the Crane rule had firmly established the true-debt approach for
nonrecourse debt, and many cases had relied on it.33 Congress' first
move was the adoption of § 465, which suspended deductions from an
activity to the extent they exceeded the taxpayer's income from the
activity, plus the taxpayer's amount at risk in the activity.3
The legislature timidly entered into what had become the courts'
arena, limiting the activities covered by § 465.35 While Congress sub-
sequently expanded § 465 to include most activities, many real estate
investments remain excluded from the at risk limitations because non-
recourse borrowings from third party lenders with respect to real
to suspend all depreciation deductions in such situations. See Lester R. Rusoff, The Fed-
eral Income Tax Consequences of Transactions Relating to Mortgages on Land, 4 Buff. L
Rev. 181,196 (1955); Daniel L. Simmons, Nonrecourse Debt and Basis: Mrs. Crane Where
Are You Now?, 53 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1, 4, 20, 58 (1979); Note, Tax Consequences of the
Disposition of Property Subject to an Unassumed Mortgage, 49 Colum. L Rev. 845, 851
(1949). This is what § 465 attempts to accomplish. Such a suspension-whether temporary
or permanent-is inconsistent with the goal of matching the cost of wasting property with
the period over which it wastes and the income that it produces over that period because
while the deductions are suspended, the cost has been incurred by someone (though not
the "purchaser"). If no depreciation deductions are allowed to anyone while receipts from
the property are taxed and the useful life of the property wanes, the income from the
property is overtaxed, even if the depreciation deductions are allowed later, because post-
ponement diminishes the present value of the deductions.
While the owner technically must include the income from the property-and some have
argued that it is appropriate to allow the owner the matching deduction, see Simmons,
supra, at 58-in fact, the lender may be the only party to the transaction with net income
because the owner is entitled to deduct the interest paid to the lender. See IRC § 163(a).
Particularly in a troubled venture, the income from the property may not exceed the cash-
paid deductible expenses. The taxpayer who finally includes the income should be entitled
to the deduction. See Section VI.
32 Cf. Rev. Rul. 80-42, 1980-1 C.B. 182, in which the taxpayer was denied basis for part
of the cash paid for property because it could not prove that the cash paid in excess of the
value of the property was not for something other than the rights purchased. The holding
shows the Service's desperation in announcing that it planned to attack cash-paid invest-
ment-after-tax commitment to the property-to frighten taxpayers away from sham
transactions.
33 See, e.g., Commissioner v. Fortee Properties, Inc., 211 F.2d 915 (2d Cir. 1954); Scott v.
Commissioner, 61 T.C. 654 (1974); Bolger v. Commissioner, 59 T.C. 760 (1973).
34 Tax Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-455, § 204,90 Stat. 1520. Amounts at risk, in
1976, as today, were limited to money and property contributed to the activity and bor-
rowed amounts for which the taxpayer had real personal liability. IRC § 465(b).
35 Those activities were: holding, producing or distributing movies or videotapes, farm-
ing, leasing § 1245 property, and exploring for oil and gas. IRC § 465(c) (before amend-
ment in 1984 by Pub. L. No. 98-369, § 432(b), 98 Stat. 494).
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property are considered amounts for which the taxpayer is at risk.36
Thus, far from leading the law's evolving treatment of nonrecourse
debt, Congress only followed the courts, when abuses had become so
widespread that the Service could not control them effectively.
The development of the tax law's response to nonrecourse debt thus
can be broken into two active periods-the period defined by Crane
and the courts, and the period of congressional action. The last dec-
ade-post-Tax Reform Act of 1986-has brought no significant legal
developments on this front; § 469 essentially closed down the individ-
ual tax shelter industry, and with it Congress' incentive to focus on
nonrecourse debt. During the early period, the courts had to deter-
mine the essential nature of nonrecourse debt, while during the tax
shelter period, all three branches of government were consumed with
trying to slow erosion of the tax base. In so doing, Congress extended
the remedies of the at risk rules significantly beyond nonrecourse debt
and halted legitimate, as well as abusive, loss taking by individual and
small corporate taxpayers engaged in passive activities.37
D. Post-Tax Shelter Challenge: Restructuring Undersecured Debt
Real estate restructurings present a new challenge to the law's
treatment of nonrecourse debt. Real estate is an important industry
in which nonrecourse debt continues to be used,38 and the decline in
36 IRC § 465(b)(6). It therefore comes as no surprise that real estate remained an at-
tractive tax shelter vehicle after the demise of many other tax minimizing investments. The
real estate industry was devastated by the 1986 Act because the passive activity loss rules
included in that legislation did precisely what the at risk rules had failed to do in the real
estate context-deny taxpayers the time value advantage of depreciation deductions attrib-
utable to debt-financed investments in real property.
If the at risk rules were intended to stop only transactions with inflated seller financing,
the qualified nonrecourse financing exception in § 465(b)(6) should not have been limited
to the activity of holding real property. The exception is better understood as a concession
to the real estate industry, rather than a policy judgment about the general reliability of
third party lenders in policing the reality of the purchase price. The adoption of
§ 469(c)(7) in 1993 exhibits a further concession to the power of the real estate lobby.
Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-66, § 13,143(a), 107 Stat. 312,
440 (allowing taxpayers who qualify as real estate "operators" to avoid the prior per se
passive classification status ascribed to all rental activities and to treat their rental activities
as nonpassive upon showing of "material participation").
37 The passive activity rules have spawned significant discussion and are beyond the
scope of this Article. See, e.g., Joseph Bankman, The Case Against Passive Investments:
A Critical Appraisal of the Passive Loss Restrictions, 42 Stan. L. Rev. 15 (1989); Robert J.
Peroni, A Policy Critique of the Section 469 Passive Loss Rules, 62 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1 (1988);
Cecily W. Rock & Daniel N. Shaviro, Passive Losses and the Improvement of Net Income
Measurement, 7 Va. Tax Rev. 1 (1987); Sims, note 3, at 325-32; Lawrence Zelenak, When
Good Preferences Go Bad: A Critical Analysis of the Anti-Tax Shelter Provisions of the
Tax Reform Act of 1986, 67 Tex. L. Rev. 499, 555-62 (1989).
38 Many of the incentives for using nonrecourse debt in real estate investments remain
as they were in the tax shelter era due to §§ 465(b)(6) and 469(c)(7).
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real estate values has led to a rash of workouts of nonrecourse debt
secured by real estate.39 Determining the tax consequences of a re-
structuring requires returning to the issue left open in Crane and
never revisited-whether a debtor should be denied depreciation de-
ductions on property as soon as the value of the property falls below
the outstanding debt. A restructuring raises this issue squarely be-
cause it provides the realization event that could trigger an inquiry
into whether the amount of the debt exceeds the value of the securing
property, and therefore, whether a taxpayer, originally awarded basis
for a nonrecourse debt encumbering the property, should be entitled
to depreciation deductions that represent an economic loss suffered
not by her, but by the lender.
The following real estate restructuring illustrates the difficulty of
current law:4o
Example 1: Assume B purchased a shopping center for $10
million, consisting of $1 million in cash and $9 million bor-
rowed on a nonrecourse basis from L, a third party lender in
the business of financing real estate. At the time of the
purchase, the real estate market was rising and there was no
question that the stated price approximated the property's
value. B's $1 million cash investment created an equity cush-
ion, and therefore no Franklin issue arose on the acquisition.
In an era of constantly rising real estate prices, subsequent ques-
tions about the bona fides of the nonrecourse debt never arise. If,
however, the value of the real estate falls, B can choose to put the
property to L instead of satisfying the debt with cash.4I In the face of
falling real estate prices, B may be unable to service the $9 million
39 Of the commercial mortgage portfolios of the major life insurance companies, 7.44%
were in workout status at the end of 1992. Kerry D. Vandell, Walter Barnes, David Hart-
zell, Dennis Kraft & William Wendt, Commercial Mortgage Defaults: Proportional
Hazards Estimation Using Individual Loan Histories, 21 J. Am. Real Est. & Urb. Econ.
Ass'n 451, 451, (1993), available in LEXIS, Nevs Library, ARCNWS File.
40 This fact pattern forms the basic model for other examples used throughout the text.
41 Nonrecourse debt can be analogized to a loan plus a put option held by the borrower
at a price equal to the outstanding principal amount of the debt. If the borrower chooses
not to satisfy the debt, the lender's only remedy is to take the property in full satisfaction
of the outstanding amount. See Yishai Beer, Nonrecourse Loans: Do Not Forget to Tax
the Option, 53 Tax Notes 837 (Nov. 18, 1991) (arguing that current law's failure to tax the
loan and option components of nonrecourse debt separately distorts both borrower's and
lender's income); Cunningham & Schenk, note 14, at 787 (analogizing nonrecourse debt to
recourse debt plus put option and a call option held by the borrower). The equivalence of
nonrecourse debt with a put option provides the theoretical underpinning for Treasury's
decision to treat the entire amount of the debt as amount realized on foreclosure. Reg.
§ 1.1001-2(a)(4)(i), (c)(Ex. 7). Cf. Charles T. Terry, Option Pricing Theory and the Eco-
nomic Incentive Analysis of Nonrecourse Acquisition Liabilities, 12 Am. J. Tax Pol'y 273
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debt with the cash flow from the property and also may be unwilling
to invest additional cash from other sources. On the other hand, L, in
the business of lending money, may not be interested in operating the
property, and therefore may agree to renegotiate the debt, rather than
foreclose on the property. In such a renegotiation, L may agree to
reduce the principal amount of the debt, defer the interest payments,
reduce the interest rate (with or without other compensation) or
otherwise alleviate the debt service burden on B and the property.42
If, for example, the value of the property has fallen to $5 million
and the parties agree to reduce the principal amount below that, L
will recognize an immediate loss for tax purposes43 and B will have
COD income.44 This is unlikely to make the parties happy, but it is, at
least, a reasonably predictable result that the parties (even in the ab-
sence of tax advice) may have expected. Reducing the principal
amount of the debt, however, requires L to accept a real economic
loss, which L is unlikely to do until unavoidable, and the parties might
not want to take such a significant step at the first sign of trouble.
Instead, they could reasonably agree to one of the following deals in
order to make the workout a less significant event from a business
perspective than a wholesale reduction of the principal:
1. The parties could reduce the interest rate by .5%, for
example, from 10% to 9.5%.45
(1995) (using option pricing theory to determine whether nonrecourse borrower has in-
curred genuine indebtedness).
The approach of this Article treats the nonrecourse borrower more like the holder of a
call than a put because the put analogy treats the borrower as the owner ab initio (who
may be replaced by the lender on exercise of the put) while the call analogy switches the
order. See Section III.D.
42 A foreclosure sale would bring no more than the cash flow from the property.
43 The lender's loss is allowed under § 166(a), so long as there has been a realization
event under § 1001. Such an event takes place when the restructured debt embodies "le-
gally distinct entitlements" from the original debt. Cottage Say. Ass'n v. Commissioner,
499 U.S. 554, 566 (1991). Reduction in the principal amount of an obligation easily satis-
fies this standard, as well as the standard in the regulations under § 1001. See notes 45-47.
44 The borrower has income pursuant to § 61(a)(12), all or part of which might be ex-
cludable under § 108(a). See notes 65-66.
45 A change in the interest rate is a significant modification of the instrument under the
§ 1001 regulations if it exceeds the greater of .25% or 5% of the annual yield of the un-
modified instrument. Reg. § 1.1001-3(e)(2)(ii). These regulations deem a modification of
a debt instrument to be an exchange (and therefore a realization event) whenever the
modified instrument differs materially in kind or in extent from the original instrument,
Reg. § 1.1001-3(b), and describe various modifications that always will constitute realiza-
tions. Reg. § 1.1001-3(e) (listing significant modifications). If a modification is significant
enough to be treated as a realization, it is a taxable event for the holder and the issuer of
the debt, subject to various nonrecognition provisions. The approach taken by the regula-
tions has been criticized. See ABA Tax Sec., Comm. on Sales, Exchanges and Basis, Com-
ments on Proposed Treasury Regulation Section 1.1001-3 Relating to Modifications of
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2. The parties could agree to extend the maturity of the
obligation by six years, with interest payments continuing at
the same rate during the extended period4 6
3. The parties could agree to defer the interest due for the
next four years until the end of the sixth year, with interest
compounding so that the yield on the instrument remained
the same,47 which would address the immediate cash flow
problems of a troubled property.
All of these workout agreements could relieve some pressure on the
borrower temporarily in the hope that the property could be made
more profitable (in other words, more valuable) and the debt satis-
fied. Parties to a workout might choose one of these options to avoid
the much more dramatic economic effects of a foreclosure; these op-
tions offer lesser rearrangements of the parties' rights and obligations.
These small changes to the debt instrument, however, can have dis-
proportionately dramatic tax consequences; if the debt exceeds the
value of the property after the workout, current law would deem each
of these workouts to be a foreclosure for tax purposes48 On a fore-
closure, the debtor is treated as having transferred the property to the
lender in satisfaction of the debt, resulting in gain or loss to the debtor
under § 1001, rather than COD income. The lender suffers a bad debt
to the extent the obligation remains unpaid, deductible under § 166.
Regardless of the terms of the restructured investment, the issue
left open in Crane and only partially resolved in Franklin-whether
the borrower should enjoy depreciation deductions on a basis attribu-
table to nonrecourse debt exceeding the value of the property-is
raised at the restructuring if the face amount of the restructured in-
strument exceeds the value of the securing property.49 At that point,
the debtor either can continue to claim depreciation allowances from
his original basis (that the market now judges to be inflated), relying
Debt Instruments, reprinted in 94 TNT 115-23, June 15, 1994, available in LEXIS, Fedtax
Library, TNT File.
The question of when a debt modification constitutes a realization event is not new. See
Philip S. Winterer, "Reissuance" and Deemed Exchanges Generally, 37 Tax Law. 509
(1984). For further discussion of debt modifications, see Section III.A.
46 Such an extension would be a significant modification. See Reg. § 1.1001-3(e)(3)(i)
(providing safe harbor for deferral periods not exceeding lesser of five years or 50% of
original term of instrument).
47 Such a deferral would be a significant modification. See Reg. § 1.1001-3(e)(2)(i); cf.
Reg. § 1.1001-3(g) (Ex. 4) (illustrating significant modification for deferral of scheduled
interest payments).
48 See Section Hm for an explanation of why minor modifications produce foreclosure
consequences.
49 Theoretically, the issue would arise as soon as the value of property falls below the
principal amount of the debt, but this issue has been ignored for lack of a realization event.
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on the improbable likelihood (and hope of the lender) that he eventu-
ally will pay for that basis with after-tax dollars, or can be stripped of
basis altogether, turning the restructuring into a calamitous tax event
for both the lender and the borrower.50 Neither outcome is satisfying.
As the next Section explains, current law seems to require that the
debtor lose all basis in the property. But the specific result for the
restructuring under current law is not as important as the insight that
analysis of the restructuring provides into the essential weakness of
the Crane rule. In considering the consequences of the restructuring,
it becomes clear that Crane supports a bulwark of the law by relying
on the transparent fiction that nonrecourse debt represents an invest-
ment in property by the borrower for which the law should give ad-
vance basis credit. The restructuring is significant in that it provides a
taxable event that requires analysis of the obligation and brings to
light the contingent nature of an investment made with nonrecourse
debt, thereby illustrating the failings of the Crane approach.
III. RESTRUCTURING UNDER CURRENT LAW
This Section analyzes the tax consequences of a nonrecourse debt
restructuring to illustrate the consequences of the true-debt approach
when the value of securing property falls below the outstanding
amount of the debt. It shows that if the nonrecourse debt exceeds the
value of the property after the restructuring, the most coherent read-
ing of current law treats the debtor as though he transferred the secur-
ing property to the lender in satisfaction of the debt.51
This conclusion is based primarily on the combined application of
the rules governing debt modifications and the approach of Estate of
Franklin, which-if it establishes a general principle of law 52-re-
quires that the restructured instrument not be respected as a debt.
Under this analysis, the principle of Estate of Franklin must be applied
at the time of the restructuring to determine whether the restructured
instrument constitutes a debt for tax purposes, because the restruc-
tured instrument is considered a "new" debt, and all new nonrecourse
debt must pass that test. If the restructured instrument does not qual-
ify as a debt for tax purposes, the statutory construct that governs debt
modifications by assuming that the restructured instrument is a debt
cannot apply to the workout and the restructured instrument must be
characterized for tax purposes. The analysis also considers whether
so The borrower could have immediate income recognition, IRC § 61(a)(12), and, as a
result of the foreclosure, the lender could be assigned basis and depreciation deductions of
no use to it. See Section V.
51 See Sections III.C-D.
52 See Section III.B.
Imaged with the Permission of N.Y.U. Tax Law Review
[Vol. 51:
HeinOnline  -- 51 Tax. L. Rev. 128 1995-1996
NONRECOURSE DEBT
an undersecured, restructured obligation can be treated as a debt with
a reduced principal amount under either § 1274 or the Third Circuit's
reasoning in Pleasant Summit,53 but concludes that the best reading of
current law would treat it as an ownership interest of the lender in the
property, meaning that the borrower would be treated as having trans-
ferred the securing property to the lender in satisfaction of the origi-
nal obligation.
The restructuring thus is treated as a disposition of property with all
the tax consequences of a foreclosure, rather than simply a modifica-
tion in terms of indebtedness between borrower and lender, as the
parties likely intended. This unexpected, and possibly economically
devastating, result of a minor modification forces the question of
whether an alternative framework for treating nonrecourse debt is
possible so that the restructuring could be treated for tax purposes
simply as a modification in the terms of indebtedness.- 4
A. Modification of a Debt Instrument
As a first step, a restructuring requires that a modification in the
terms of the original debt be evaluated under § 1001. Any significant
53 Pleasant Summit Land Corp v. Commissioner, 863 F.2d 263 (3d Cir. 1988), cert. de-
nied sub nom. Commissioner v. Prussin, 493 U.S. 901 (1989).
54 The results may be devastating if they produce immediate tax or strip the taxpayer of
tax attributes necessary for profitability. Congress has recognized that a restructuring is
not an ideal time for the debtor to pay tax because the restructuring indicates a troubled
debt. In the 1993 Act, Congress addressed workouts of debt secured by real estate by
adding §§ 108(a)(1)(D) and (c). Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993, Pub. L No.
103-66, § 13,150(a), (b), 107 Stat. 312, 446. Pursuant to those provisions, a debtor may
reduce the basis of depreciable real property instead of currently including discharge of
qualified real property business indebtedness in income to the extent that the debt dis-
charged exceeded the value of the property. With these provisions, the Code now provides
relief for certain taxpayers who incur COD income under § 61(a)(12). While
§ 108(a)(1)(D) provides direct relief to many taxpayers with troubled real estate indebted-
ness, it offers no help to those who have income characterized as gain (which arises from
foreclosure characterization) rather than as income from discharge of indebtedness. Cf.
Estate of Delman v. Commissioner, 73 T.C. 15, 31-33 (1979) (insolvent individual required
to recognize gain on disposition of property).
The debate about nonrecourse debt has focused considerable attention on the issue of
whether release from a nonrecourse liability should be treated as amount realized or as
COD income. See Commissioner v. Tufts, 461 U.S. 300,317-20 (1983) (O'Connor J., con-
curring); Alice Cunningham, Payment of Debt With Property-The Two-Step Analysis Af-
ter Commissioner v. Tufts, 38 Tax Law. 575 (1985); Deborah A. Geier, Tufts and the
Evolution of Debt-Discharge Theory, 1 Fla. Tax Rev. 115 (1992). Unfortunately, the dis-
cussion has revolved around Tufts, which did not lend itself to a traditional cancellation of
indebtedness analysis since the lender did not forgive the liability. Cancellation of indebt-
edness stems from the relationship of lender and borrower and arises from an adjustment
in the obligation between those parties. See United States v. Kirby Lumber Co., 284 U.S. 1
(1931); Reg. § 1.61-12(a). While there are appropriate cases to consider cancellation of
indebtedness attributable to nonrecourse debt, Tufts is not one of them.
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change in terms is treated as a realization event, and the original debt
instrument is deemed exchanged for the modified instrument, if the
modified instrument "differs materially either in kind or in extent"
from the original.55 The regulations under § 1001 also provide that
"[a] modification is significant if it changes the [debt] instrument to an
instrument ... that is not debt for Federal tax purposes. ' ' 56 In the
context of a restructuring, these rules are significant because they cre-
ate a taxable event during the holding period of the property that may
affect its tax treatment. Unfortunately, the debt modification rules do
not seem to appreciate that the modified debt has been included in
the basis of property. If the realization event with respect to the debt
can be divorced from the securing property, the tax consequences of
the restructuring may be limited to the debt, so that the basis of the
property is unaffected by the transaction.5 7 If not, the consequences
for the securing property are unclear.5 8
55 Reg. § 1.1001-3(b). In Cottage Sav. Ass'n v. Commissioner, the Supreme Court es-
tablished a standard that inquires whether an instrument is exchanged for one (pre- and
post-modification) with different legal entitlements. 499 U.S. 554, 565-66 (1991). Com-
mentators have referred to this standard as the "hair-trigger" test. See Richard L. Bacon
& Harold L. Adrion, Taxable Events: The Aftermath of Cottage Savings (Part 1), 59 Tax
Notes 1227, 1229 (May 31, 1993).
Section 108(e)(10), which describes the amount of COD income recognized by a tax-
payer on the modification of a debt instrument, also treats the modification as an exchange
of the old instrument for a new instrument. That section treats a debtor as having satisfied
the original debt instrument with an amount of money equal to the issue price of
the new debt instrument. The Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993 repealed
former § 108(e)(10), and redesignated § 108(e)(11) as § 108(e)(10). Pub. L. No. 103-66,
§ 13,226(a)(1)(A), 107 Stat. 312, 487.
56 Reg. § 1.1001-3(e)(5)(i). Once there is a realization, a complete analysis of the
deemed exchange is necessary. That analysis would have to consider the consequences of
exchanging a debt instrument for an instrument that is not debt for tax purposes. This
provision was among the most controversial in the proposed regulations under § 1001.
See, e.g., IRS to Issue 'Cottage Savings' Rules in First Half of 1994, Official Says, Daily Tax
Rep. (BNA), Nov. 16, 1993, at G-7.
57 For example, if third-party purchase money debt is reduced from $10 to $8 so that
income to the debtor of $2 with respect to the debt is triggered by the modification, and if
the modification does not affect the property, the basis of the property continues to reflect
the original $10 debt. The value of the property would not matter in this case, and taxation
of any built-in gain or loss on the property would remain deferred after the restructuring
until a separate realization event occurs.
58 If the property is implicated in the restructuring, at least three results from the exam-
ple in note 57 are possible: The basis of the property could be reduced in this example by
$2; or assuming the lender forgave $2 but the value of the property had declined by $3, the
basis might be reduced to $7, or possibly zero. A fourth possible approach would require
the borrower to include an amount equal to prior depreciation claimed that was not funded
by the borrower's cash.
Section 108(e)(5) authorizes reduction of basis where the lender was the seller of the
property. But no similar rule applies where the purchase money was borrowed from a
third party, since the application of Fulton Gold Corp. v. Commissioner, 31 B.T.A. 519
(1934), to such a scenario has been rejected. See Rev. Rul. 91-31, 1991-1 C.B. 19 (citing
Gershkowitz v. Commissioner, 88 T.C. 984 (1987)).
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1. Effect of Changes in Debt on Basis in Securing Property
Most debt transactions that occur while a taxpayer holds an asset do
not implicate the realization rule, and therefore do not affect the
owner's basis in the securing property.59 This is so even if the debt
was acquisition debt included in basis at the outset. For example, a
debtor's satisfaction of acquisition indebtedness while still holding the
property has no tax consequences. The purchaser received advance
basis credit for the investment represented by the debt, and satisfac-
tion of the debt is consistent with that basis credit. Less obviously, a
second mortgage on the property or a refinancing, even one that ex-
ceeds the taxpayer's basis in the property, does not lead to immediate
taxation, even when it represents a withdrawal of the appreciation in
the property.60 That appreciation will be taxed as gain on a later reali-
zation with respect to the property, even though the cash already has
been enjoyed. Because of the realization rule, economically signifi-
cant events may take place during the holding period of property that
do not lead to immediate taxability.61 Neither a precipitous decline
nor a marked increase in the value of the property has immediate tax
consequences. 62
Sometimes, the same event affects both the debt that encumbers
property and the property itself. For example, on the acquisition of
property with debt, the debt is treated as part of the purchaser's cost.
Similarly, the disposition of property subject to nonrecourse debt is
treated as a disposition of the debt as well, and the amount realized on
the disposition of the property includes the outstanding amount of the
debt the purchaser takes subject to or assumes.63
A swap of one debt instrument for another debt instrument, or a
modification of a debt into another instrument that also constitutes
debt, fits under the first system-the debt transaction does not affect
the property. Debt modifications in which the post-workout instru-
ment fails to constitute debt, however, do seem to implicate the
property.64
59 The realization rule, though distortive in measuring income, is likely to remain a per-
manent fixture of the income tax system, and this Article works within its constraint. For a
proposal that would dramatically decrease its role in the system, see David J. Shakow,
Taxation Without Realization: A Proposal for Accrual Taxation, 134 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1111
(1986); see also Cunningham & Schenk, note 14.
60 See Woodsam Assocs., Inc. v. Commissioner, 198 F.2d 357 (2d Cir. 1952).
61 Substitution of collateral does not automatically trigger realization, even under the
hair-trigger test in the regulations. Reg. § 1.1001-3(e)(4)(iv).
62 See Reg. § 1.165-4(a) (disallowing deduction for decline in value of stock due to mar-
ket fluctuation).
63 See Reg. § 1.1001-2(a); Commissioner v. Tifts, 461 U.S. 300 (1983).
64 See Section llI.D.
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2. Consequences of a Debt-for-Debt Exchange
A debt modification significant enough to be treated as a debt-for-
debt exchange (a realization event under § 1001) is clearly a realiza-
tion event with respect to the debt only, as long as the modified instru-
ment is respected as debt for tax purposes. The property is not
affected. The borrower's tax consequence of a debt-for-debt modifi-
cation is COD income under § 61(a)(12), subject to various relief
provisions.65
A debt-for-debt exchange that produces COD income often will
have no effect on the borrower's basis in the property.66 This is
proper because taxation of COD income represents a tax cost to the
borrower that continues to support the taxpayer's basis. At the same
time, the lender is entitled to an immediate loss for the portion of the
debt forgiven.67 These tax consequences of a deemed reissuance of
the debt match the consequences of the economically identical trans-
action-a satisfaction of the mortgage for cash, in an amount less than
the principal amount of the debt, followed by a new mortgage with a
reduced principal amount.68 In this way, the statutory approach
seems reasonably logical and practical.
B. Should Estate of Franklin Apply to Restructured Debt?
If the modification of a debt instrument cannot be characterized as
a debt-for-debt exchange, it does not fit into the model of a satisfac-
tion followed by a new mortgage. If the new instrument is something
other than debt, the tax treatment under current law is not entirely
clear, because the debt-for-debt exchange rules apply only if the old
65 Section 108 excludes COD income if the discharge of the debt occurs in a bankruptcy
case, IRC § 108(a)(1)(A), if the discharge occurs when the taxpayer is insolvent, IRC
§ 108(a)(1)(B), if the discharged debt is qualified farm indebtedness, § IRC 108(a)(1)(C),
or if the discharged debt is qualified real property business indebtedness, § 108(a)(1)(D).
Under any of these provisions, a reduction in tax attributes (or basis) to the extent that
COD income is excluded often operates to defer taxation rather than permanently forgive
it. Section 108(e)(5) also avoids immediate income recognition by reducing the basis of
property when seller financing is reduced.
66 Under § 108(b)(5), however, the debtor may elect to reduce basis rather than tax
attributes as to income excluded under § 108(a).
67 IRC § 166. There are exceptions for seller financing. See, e.g., IRC § 1038 (providing
that sellers recognize no gain or loss when foreclosing on property they had sold on credit).
68 The repeal of IRC § 1275(a)(4), which had allowed the taxpayer to carry the adjusted
issue price of the original debt over to the restructured debt in recapitalization transac-
tions, reflects this view. Since its repeal, taxpayers must recognize income on the restruc-
turing of a debt instrument into a modified instrument with a lower issue price, as though
the old instrument were satisfied with cash and a new, lesser obligation issued. See N.Y.
St. Bar Ass'n Tax Sec., Report of Ad Hoc Committee on Provisions of the Revenue Rec-
onciliation Act of 1990 Affecting Debt-for-Debt Exchanges, reprinted in 51 Tax Notes 79,
85 (Apr. 8, 1991).
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debt is exchanged for something qualifying as debt for tax purposes.
The securing property may be implicated in the debt transaction.69 A
restructuring that leaves the nonrecourse obligation undersecured
raises the question whether Franklin should apply at the time of modi-
fication so as to produce an instrument that does not constitute debt.70
If so, the restructuring would not fit within the statutory construct that
depends on the equivalence of a modification and a satisfaction fol-
lowed by a new mortgage,71 and therefore, the tax consequences of
the exchange would not be governed by the debt-for-debt exchange
rules. This Subsection argues that the restructured instrument must
be evaluated under Franklin because the restructuring is a realization
event for the debt, and the deemed new debt must be analyzed like
any other new debt.
Even assuming that a traditional debt-equity analysis72 would iden-
tify more debt-like features than equity-like features, the inquiry is
not finished. Since § 1001 treats the restructured obligation as a new
instrument, and since the modified instrument is nonrecourse, it is not
debt for tax purposes unless it passes muster under the Franklin test73
at the time of the restructuring. I argue that the Franklin principle
69 As long as there is a realization event for the debt, one must inquire as to whether the
restructured instrument is debt-this is explicit under § 1.1001-3 of the regulations, but
would be necessary even if those regulations did not contain § 1.1001-3(e)(5).
70 There are many reasons why the restructured instrument may no longer constitute a
debt of the debtor. See Robert Cassanos, Alternatives to Disposition of Real Estate: Par-
ticipating Loans, Convertible Loans, Net Leases and Joint Venture Arrangements, 48 Inst.
Fed. Tax'n 31 (1990); Jack M. Feder, "Either A Partner or a Lender Be": Emerging Issues
in Real Estate Finance, 36 Tax Law. 191 (1983). Those articles consider the characteriza-
tion of real estate mortgages as loans or joint ventures. Where sufficient equity elements
are present in the restructured debt (such as shared appreciation and contingent interest
dependent on profits from the activity), the restructuring may constitute a transformation
similar to the one described in this Article.
71 IRC § 108(e)(10).
72 The determination of whether an instrument constitutes debt or equity for tax pur-
poses depends on its characteristics. The case law, which primarily concerns corporate
debt versus equity, relies on a wide variety of factors, including those listed in § 385(b).
See, e.g., Hardman v. United States, 827 F.2d 1409 (9th Cir. 1987) (considering 11 factors:
designation by parties, presence or absence of maturity date, source of payments, right to
enforce payment, participation in management, status as compared with other creditors,
intent of parties, adequacy of capitalization, identity of interest between creditor and
stockholders, payment of interest out of dividend money only and ability of corporation to
obtain loans from third parties). Only one case has held that a loan should be bifurcated
into debt and equity elements. See Farley Realty Corp. v. Commissioner, 279 F.2d 701 (2d
Cir. 1960). For an overview of debt-equity issues in the corporate context, see William T.
Plumb, Jr., The Federal Income Tax Significance of Corporate Debt: A Critical Analysis
and a Proposal, 26 Tax L. Rev. 369 (1971).
The Service has announced that it will scrutinize instruments containing both debt and
equity characteristics to determine the proper tax treatment. Rev. Rul. 94-28, 1994-1 C.B.
86; Notice 94-48, 1994-1 C.B. 357; Notice 94-47, 1994-1 C.B. 357.
73 Estate of Franklin v. Commissioner, 544 F.2d 1045, 1049 (9th Cir. 1976). But see
Pleasant Summit Land Corp. v. Commissioner, 863 F.2d 263 (3d Cir. 1988) (awarding basis
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applies in this case and is not limited to seller-financed tax-shelter
acquisitions.
On the narrowest reading of the facts of the case, the Franklin prin-
ciple applies when property is acquired in return for nonrecourse
seller-financing. Critics could argue, therefore, that a restructuring
can be distinguished from Franklin on three factual distinctions: (1)
Franklin involved a clearly abusive transaction; (2) it involved seller-
financing, and (3) it was concerned with the inception of the debt.74
These differences do not provide a compelling reason to ignore Frank-
lin on the restructuring because that decision creates a principled stan-
dard for debt entitled to respect, which recognizes the definitional
contingency of nonrecourse debt. Because of the contingent nature of
nonrecourse debt, the Franklin rule's assessment turns on the tax-
payer satisfying his burden of proof as to the value of the property.
None of the distinguishing facts are relevant to the question whether
the taxpayer reasonably can be expected to satisfy the debt.
Furthermore, there is no indication in the opinion (and no compel-
ling reason) that the Franklin standard depends on a taxpayer's in-
volvement in an abusive tax shelter; the Ninth Circuit does not
question Dr. Franklin's integrity.75 The court stated:
It is fundamental that "depreciation is not predicated upon
ownership of property but rather upon an investment in prop-
erty." No such investment exists when payment of the
purchase price in accordance with the design of the parties
yields no equity to the purchaser.... [A]ssuming no substan-
tial increase in the fair market value of the property, the ab-
sence of personal liability on the debt reduces the transaction
in economic terms to a mere chance that a genuine debt obli-
gation may arise.76
for debt to the extent it did not exceed value of the property), cert. denied sub nom. Com-
missioner v. Prussin, 493 U.S. 901 (1989).
74 The Second Circuit has noted that it is improper to look to the subsequent value of
the property after the creation of the debt in determining whether the debt initially should
be respected. See Lebowitz v. Commissioner, 917 F.2d 1314 (2d Cir. 1990).
7S In fact, the court was not interested in discussing whether the transaction was a sham:
Petitioners spent a substantial amount of time at trial attempting to establish
that, whatever the actual market value of the property, Associates acted in the
good faith belief that the market value of the property approximated the sell-
ing price. However, this evidence only goes to the issue of sham and does not
supply substance to this transaction. "Save in those instances where the statute
itself turns on intent, a matter so real as taxation must depend on objective
realities, not on the varying subjective beliefs of individual taxpayers."
544 F.2d at 1048 n.4 (quoting Lynch v. Commissioner, 273 F.2d 867, 872 (2d Cir. 1959)
(emphasis in original).
76 Id. at 1049 (citations omitted) (emphasis in original).
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The only part of the Ninth Circuit's opinion that might support an
interpretation limiting the principle to abusive situations is the caveat
at the end: "We intend our holding and explanation thereof to be
understood as limited to transactions substantially similar to that now
before us."77 It did not explain the characteristics essential to a "sub-
stantially similar" case. It is reasonable to infer that any case in which
the taxpayer is unable to show that the value of the property gives the
borrower an incentive to pay the debt is similar7 s
One could argue that a restructuring does not present the possibili-
ties for abuse that occurred in Franklin due to the presence of a third
party lender policing the transaction. A lender providing cash insures
that the original purchase price of the property was not inflated and
that the debt started as legitimate debt of the borrower. Nevertheless,
the crucial conclusion reached by the court in Franklin was that the
debtor had no incentive to pay the debt because he had no equity in
the property7 9 This conclusion does not depend on either abuse po-
tential or the seller financing the transaction; by definition, a nonre-
course debtor always can walk away from the property, rather than
satisfy the obligation. Therefore, the Franklin principle is potentially
relevant to every nonrecourse debt.
The taxpayer's incentive to pay the debt is just as important on a
restructuring as it was on the original issuance of the debt. Since the
essential issue for nonrecourse debt is always whether the debt resem-
bles an unconditional commitment to the property, the existence of
abuse, the identity of the lender and the timing of the inquiry are irrel-
evant. To distinguish instruments based on irrelevant differences is
bad policy. The theory behind the Franklin rule is enduring-to treat
nonrecourse debt like real debt only when it has the characteristics of
real debt.80 Therefore, Franklin should be read as creating a standard
771d.
78 The court did not want to evaluate "bad bargains"-where the purchaser is on the
hook for an excessive purchase price. The troubling part of this reference is the court's
citation of Commissioner v. Brown, 380 U.S. 563 (1965) and Union Bank v. United States,
285 F.2d 126 (Ct. Cl. 1961). Those cases were not bad bargains in which a taxpayer over-
paid in cash to purchase property (a situation clearly outside the Franklin principle). The
cases involved bootstrap sales of businesses to tax-exempt organizations, seeking to con-
vert ordinary income into capital gain for the sellers, without producing taxable income to
the exempt organizations. Congress responded to those clearly abusive transactions in
1969 by adopting § 514, which requires tax-exempt organizations to include income from
debt-financed assets in unrelated business taxable income. Despite those citations, Frank-
lin is better read as excluding the true bad bargain from its reach.
79 Estate of Franklin, 544 F.2d at 1049.
80 Professor Charles Terry has used option pricing theory to argue that, as the amount of
nonrecourse debt increases, the value of the implicit put option decreases, suggesting that
the nonrecourse obligor will default on the mortgage. See Terry, note 41, at 344-64.
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to be applied to all nonrecourse debt, whenever it fails to resemble an
unconditional obligation to pay.81
The realization rule, however, imposes a practical limitation on the
universal application of this principle. Theoretically, any time the
value of the property falls, the Franklin principle could apply and un-
dermine the debt,8 because the debtor may choose to walk away from
the property. Once debt is incurred, its treatment generally is not re-
visited again until its disposition, alone or with the property.8 3 If,
however, the restructuring provides a realization event, the deemed
new debt should be subject to the same scrutiny as any other new
debt. If, after the restructuring, the value of the property is less than
the new debt, the debtor has as little incentive to satisfy this now-
excessive debt as did the debtor in Franklin.s4 Therefore, the restruc-
tured instrument should not be treated as debt.85
Thus, if the $9 million debt in Example 1,86 is restructured when the
value of the property is $5 million, Franklin requires that the restruc-
tured instrument have an issue price not greater than $5 million in
order to be respected as debt. Assuming the property is worth $5 mil-
lion and is encumbered with $7 million of post-workout nonrecourse
81 At the restructuring, the parties always can choose to satisfy the Franklin standard
and recreate an incentive for the borrower by reducing the principal amount of the debt.
82 This issue is an interesting one, but is beyond the scope of this discussion because I
presume the creation of a new instrument on the restructuring, thus triggering the realiza-
tion rule. Where a modification is not significant under § 1.1001-3 of the regulations, the
old instrument continues to exist, and there is no realization event. Nevertheless, the
Franklin principle might apply. The potential for ignoring the existence of an obligation in
the normal course of holding always has been lurking in the tax treatment of nonrecourse
debt, but has never been resolved due to the general absence of realization events during
the holding period. Cf. David C. Garlock, Federal Income Taxation of Debt Instruments
4-34 (3d ed. 1994) (discussing whether interest on nonrecourse debt may accrue when prin-
cipal balance of obligation and all accrued but unpaid interest exceed the value of securing
property).
83 On disposition of the property, it is clear that the debt is included in amount realized,
Crane v. Commissioner, 331 U.S. 1, 14 (1947), even where the debt exceeds the value of
the property, Commissioner v. Tufts, 461 U.S. 300, 311 (1983). Absent property disposi-
tion, forgiven nonrecourse debt can give rise to COD income, Rev. Rul. 91-31, 1991-1 C.B.
19, but may be excluded under § 108(a)(1)(D). See also § 108(c)(2). An exception is pro-
vided in § 108(e)(5).
84 The restructuring does not eliminate the borrower's ability to walk away from the
property, even though it indicates that the borrower desires to remain in control of the
property. If the terms of the debt are modified so that the current payments are reduced,
the borrower reduces his commitment to the property by virtue of the restructuring, even
as he chooses to continue in possession.
85 Once the property is worth less than the debt, from an economic perspective, the note
represents an equity-like investment of the lender, and the only vestiges of the debtor-
creditor relationship are the legal technicalities and tax consequences.
86 See text accompanying notes 39-47.
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debt, the debt is not true debt because the rational debtor would
rather walk away from the property than pay $7 million to keep it.87
The conclusion under Franklin that the post-workout instrument is
not debt is crucial under current law because the workout therefore is
not a debt-for-debt exchange, and its tax consequences will differ from
the simple COD income/bad debt deduction results. The next two
Sections analyze the post-workout instrument.
C. Avoiding Franklin by Reducing the Principal Amount
of the Debt
This Section considers whether the problem of recharacterizing the
new instrument on a restructuring can be solved either by rejecting
the Franklin approach in favor of the Third Circuit's approach in
Pleasant Summit,88 or by interpreting Franklin more narrowly and
manipulating the treatment of the restructured instrument under
§ 1274. Both solutions would be much less expansive than revamping
the entire approach to nonrecourse debt because they would reduce
the principal amount of the debt and thus the instrument would re-
main as debt. I conclude they are neither viable under current law nor
desirable as a policy matter.
The principal argument is that it would be more sensible to treat the
restructured instrument as a debt obligation with an issue price equal
to the value of the property. That approach relies on the theory of
Pleasant Summit (even if a statutory basis were found in § 1274) and
accounts for the restructured instrument at its approximate value.
The Pleasant Summit reasoning would lead to the conclusion that the
principal amount of the restructured instrument was the value of the
property. Thus, the new instrument would constitute debt, and would
fit within the construct of the debt-for-debt exchange rules.
If the instrument were a new purchase money note, the principal
amount might be deemed to be the value of the property, assuming
87 Excessive restructured debt is not as easy to ignore as excessive acquisition debt be-
cause the taxpayer rationally might intend to satisfy the excessive debt because of collat-
eral considerations. For example, if the debt is secured by the taxpayer's business
premises, which were constructed to meet the unique needs of the taxpayer's business, the
taxpayer might be willing to pay a premium to retain those premises. This possibility turns
on whether a property can have different values to different people. Cf. Leslie Co. v.
Commissioner, 539 F.2d 943 (3d Cir. 1976) (finding that taxpayer had paid more for prop-
erty than it was objectively worth in a sale-leaseback case); Shaviro, Risk and Accrual,
note 1, at 428, and n. 130 (arguing that some taxpayers might legitimately and rationally
pay more for property than its objective value).
88 Pleasant Summit Land Corp. v. Commissioner, 863 F.2d 263 (3d Cir. 1988), cert. de-
nied sub nom. Commissioner v. Prussin, 493 U.S. 401 (1989).
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the parties dealt at arm's length.8 9 For example, if the value of prop-
erty originally purchased for $10 fell to $5, it might make sense, from
the perspective of a coherent law, to treat the debt as $5, even if its
stated principal amount remained $9.90 Treating the instrument as a
smaller debt might do the least violence to the parties' intentions be-
cause it respects their expectations about tax ownership and entitle-
ment to depreciation on the property. There is, however, no means
under current law by which to reach that conclusion. Pleasant Summit
is the nonstatutory route to this result, but it is fundamentally flawed;
§ 1274 is the potential statutory vehicle, but it cannot carry this
burden. 91
In Pleasant Summit, the court awarded basis credit for inflated non-
recourse debt up to the value of the securing property because it rea-
soned that the purchaser would have an incentive to pay that much,
although not the entire debt, when it came due.92 Similarly, the seller-
lender would accept that lesser payment. After all, the court rea-
soned, why foreclose when to do so would yield no more than the
89 The current value of property presumably reflects the possibility that the price will
rise or fall in the future. The right to choose whether to redeem the property at the face
amount of the debt in the future requires the borrower to pay a premium interest rate. But
see Babette B. Barton, Economic Fables/Tax-Related Foibles: On the "Cost" of Promis-
sory Notes, Guarantees, Contingent Liabilities and Nonrecourse Loans, 45 Tax L. Rev.
471, 500 (1990) (asserting that excessive nonrecourse debt might be price paid by buyer for
the privilege of nonrecourse financing, and thereby constitute valid cost of the property
that is not in the nature of interest).
90 This treatment would require that the debtor include $5 of COD income under
§ 61(a)(12), subject to the exceptions in § 108.
91 Judicial examination of restructured instruments on a case-by-case basis might
achieve this result; this generally was the approach of the Tax Court in Regents Park Part-
ners v. Commissioner, 63 T.C.M. (CCH) 3131 (1992). The court allowed the purchasers a
value basis in the property despite an excessive mortgage to which the property was subject
at the time of acquisition. Two crucial factors in that case were: (1) the parties reasonably
expected the principal amount of the obligation to be reduced after the end of the period
during which HUD restrictions prevented reduction, and (2) the mortgage (held by HUD)
bore interest at a rate significantly below market. The principal amount of the debt would
have been reasonable if it had been adjusted in accordance with prevailing market interest
rates. While § 1274 did not apply to that case, the result reached is consistent with Its
policy and Congress' recognition that the payments on a debt obligation are fungible and
can be designated as either principal or interest. Not all restructurings can fit into this
precedent because adjustment of the interest rate is not always the solution to the problem
of excessive principal.
92 The taxpayer, a participant in an abusive tax shelter transaction, claimed basis for a
purchase price paid partly in cash and partly in inflated nonrecourse debt. Rather than
ignore the debt and limit the basis in the property to the cash paid, which would have been
consistent with the reasoning in Franklin, the Third Circuit allowed the taxpayer to claim a
basis equal to the cash invested, plus the nonrecourse debt, up to the value of the property.
See Pleasant Summit, 863 F.2d at 277.
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value of the property that the purchaser, in any event, would offer in
satisfaction of the debt?93
The Third Circuit's reasoning is flawed, and has not been adopted
by any other circuit.94 Its approach missed the mark because it failed
to focus on the significance of basis in the tax system and the assump-
tions that underlie the award of basis for debt prior to satisfaction. 95
A focus on these issues would have revealed that any future deal the
borrower and lender might make (assuming that they, in fact, would
make a deal) is irrelevant to the determination of the true acquisition
price, and hence the basis, at the outset of the transaction. For this
reason, it is not desirable to choose the Pleasant Summit (rather than
the Franklin) approach, which would treat the restructured instrument
as debt with a reduced issue price. The principles of these two cases
are irreconcilable and the Third Circuit's conclusion is perverse be-
cause it presumes that the purchaser overpaid for the property at the
outset-whatever cash was paid necessarily was wasted because the
purchaser still would have to pay at least future value to forestall
foreclosure.
Reliance on § 1274 ultimately rests on the Pleasant Summit princi-
ple, and, therefore, is also undesirable in solving the restructuring puz-
zle. In a debt-for-debt exchange, the restructured debt is deemed
issued in exchange for "property," the old debt.96 Section 1274 there-
93 See id. at 276. Of course, if the Third Circuit's vision of this minuet of self-interested
rationality were accurate, the jurisprudence would not reflect a single case of foreclosure.
94 The Second, Fifth and Ninth Circuits have rejected Pleasant Sunmit explicitly. See
Lebowitz v. Commissioner, 917 F.2d 1314, 1319 (2d Cir. 1990); Lukens v. Commissioner,
945 F.2d 92,98-99 (5th Cir. 1991); Hildebrand v. Commissioner, 967 F.2d 350,353 (9th Cir.
1992). The Tax Court once held similarly to the Third Circuit, but only where the facts
were distinguishable from those of Pleasant Summit. Regents Park Parmers, 63 T.C.M.
(CCII) 3131; see note 91.
For a more complete discussion of the flaws in Pleasant Summit, see Johnson, Front End,
note 3, at 593; see also Terry, note 41, at 388-93 (using option pricing analysis to argue that
taxpayers in Pleasant Summit should have been allowed no tax basis for the nonrecourse
debt).
95 Taxpayers are entitled to basis for acquisition debt as "advance credit" for an invest-
ment that the law presumes will be made in the future. See Mayerson v. Commissioner, 47
T.C. 340, 352 (1966). This explains an award of basis supported by nonrecourse debt as
well as recourse debt. The Crane opinion gave basis for nonrecourse debt because the
Supreme Court believed that the debtor would treat the norecourse debt as recourse debt
encumbering the property-fairly representing a future investment in the property. See id.
(citing Crane). When nonrecourse debt is inflated, it does not represent an investment that
the purchaser will likely make in the future. Inflated nonrecourse debt is better character-
ized as an option to purchase the property at a future time, or perhaps as contingent debt,
rather than a current commitment to the property. The Tax Court characterized the
Franklin transaction as an option. See Estate of Franklin v. Commissioner, 64 T.C. 752,
762 (1975). But see Barton, note 89, at 501-05 (arguing that some inflated nonrecourse
debt represents economic cost).
96 IRC § 108(e)(10); Reg. § 1.1274-1(a) (providing that "[flor purposes of section 1274,
property includes debt instruments").
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fore controls the determination of issue price when neither the new
debt nor the old debt is publicly traded.97 Under § 1274, the issue
price of the debt is the stated principal amount of the obligation if it
bears adequate stated interest.98 If not, the issue price is determined
by reference to the imputed principal amount of the obligation.99 In
certain "potentially abusive situations," the statute equates the im-
puted principal amount with the value of the property for which the
debt is exchanged. 100 Among others, a potentially abusive situation
can be "any... situation which, by reason of-.., nonre6ourse fi-
nancing.., is of a type which the Secretary specifies by regulations as
having potential for tax avoidance."'' 1 The Secretary has not issued
regulations that adequately define this category. 102
If the nonrecourse financing in the restructuring is a potentially
abusive situation, the issue price of the new debt obligation is limited
to the value of the old debt obligation, which is likely to approximate
the value of the property since the lender is limited to the remedy of
recovering the securing property on the debtor's default. 0 3 If § 1274
could reduce the principal amount of the new debt obligation to the
value of the securing property, the restructuring no longer would run
afoul of the Franklin principle. The restructuring would be a debt-for-
debt exchange, with COD income to the debtor in an amount equal to
the difference between the face amount of the original instrument and
the issue price of the new instrument. This result is not ideal for a
debtor who is unable to exclude the income under § 108, but the vir-
97 Neither the old debt nor the restructured debt is likely to be traded publicly, (unless
the public markets created by FNMA, for example, are deemed to make the individual
mortgages publicly traded).
One commentator has argued that § 1274 should not apply to troubled debt restructur-
ings because the abuses that led to § 1274's passage are unlikely to exist in such transac-
tions. C. Ronald Kalteyer, Real Estate Workouts-Original Issue Discount Implications of
Troubled Debt Restructurings, 43 Tax Law. 579, 655 (1990).
98 IRC § 1274(a)(1).
99 IRC § 1274(a)(2).
100 The potentially abusive situations described in § 1274(b)(3) only affect the imputed
principal amount of the obligation, suggesting that there must be inadequate stated interest
to raise the possibility of determination of the issue price by reference to the value of the
property.
101 IRC § 1274(b)(3)(B)(ii)(II).
102 The statute can be said to exclude any situation from the potentially abusive rules
unless specifically mentioned in regulations. In addition, § 1.1274-3(b)(1) of the regula-
tions provides that an exchange of a nonrecourse debt instrument for an outstanding debt
instrument will not cause the exchange to be classified as a potentially abusive situation.
This regulation provides further support for limiting the scope of the potentially abusive
situation rules in the context of debt modifications. It does not provide, however, a safe
harbor for purported nonrecourse debt that does not actually constitute debt at all.
103 See Vandell et al., note 39, available in LEXIS, News Library, ACRNWS File, at 5
(noting that value of nonrecourse loan is bounded at value of the property).
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tue of this approach is its simplicity-the debt remains isolated from
the property and the transaction has no effect on the borrower's basis.
If this were the proper reading of "potentially abusive situations" in
§ 1274(b)(3), all nonrecourse debt instruments would be bootstrapped
into debt for tax purposes.1o This interpretation of the statute essen-
tially would codify the Pleasant Summit approach. Because of its
flaws, it would be unwise to import the holding of Pleasant Summit
into the interpretation of § 1274 or to advocate a change in the law
that would have such an effect.'05
Section 1274 is better read as a narrower provision, one that deter-
mines the issue price of a debt obligation only after the instrument is
independently determined to be a debt for tax purposes. This reading
of § 1274 is consistent with the congressional staff's understanding of
that section:
The limitations on principal amount imposed by [§ 1274] do
not override prior case law dealing with overstatement of ba-
sis and other abuses in transactions involving nonrecourse
debt. As under prior law, an obligation must represent a
bona fide indebtedness of the purchaser-issuer to be
respected for purposes of the OLD rules and other provisions
of the Code. Thus, if a nonrecourse obligation is given in
exchange for property having a value less than the principal
amount of the purported debt obligation (determined in
accordance with these new provisions), the obligation may
be disregarded in whole or in part under general principles
of tax law and basis, interest deductions, and other tax bene-
104 One exception might be instruments with adequate stated interest, which appear to
be outside the scope of the potentially abusive situation rules. This dichotomy easily could
be manipulated by taxpayers, however, choosing to issue either current pay or discount
obligations. For example, a taxpayer might issue an instrument with no stated interest.
Under § 1274(b)(1), the imputed principal amount of the instrument might exceed the
value of the property, so if that amount had been the stated principal amount, there would
have been a Franklin problem. By failing to state any interest, the taxpayer who could call
upon § 1274(b)(3) might bypass the Franklin inquiry (and its harsh consequences) and
might have the imputed principal amount reduced below the § 1274(b)(1) amount to the
value of the property. While this lower basis would provide fewer tax benefits in the way
of depreciation deductions, it would preserve the basis attributable to the debt up to the
value.
105 David Garlock has recognized the "technical circularity" possible in the potentially
abusive situation rules, and has concluded that the 1984 Senate Report and additional sub-
stantial authority would allow the Service to disregard a debt instrument, rather than sub-
ject it to the original issue discount rules. Garlock, note 82, at 4-33 to 4-34 (citing S. Rep.
No. 98-169, vol. 1, at 256 (1984)).
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fits may be denied. See, e.g., Estate of Franklin v.
Commissioner.10 6
The reference to Franklin makes clear that § 1274 operates to deter-
mine the principal amount of an obligation only if the instrument is
determined to be debt for tax purposes under the Franklin standard.
Therefore, even if an obligation has adequate stated interest, if the
principal amount of the obligation exceeds the value of the securing
property, § 1274 has no application. Such an obligation is simply not
debt.107 Therefore, in a restructuring, a determination that the instru-
ment is debt for tax purposes must be made, and where the debtor has
no equity in the property, Franklin teaches that the obligation will not
be respected as a debt for tax purposes.
D. Recharacterizing Debt as an Interest in Property
The conclusion that reducing the principal amount of the debt is
unsound leaves only one choice under current law for characterizing
the restructured instrument. This Section argues that the restructured
instrument is best characterized as an ownership interest in the prop-
erty. If the new instrument is an ownership interest, restructuring
strips the borrower of the tax attributes associated with ownership and
frustrates the expectations of the parties. 08
106 Staff of the Joint Comm. on Tax'n, 98th Cong., 2d Sess., General Explanation of the
Revenue Provisions of the Deficit Reduction Act of 1984, at 119 (Comm. Print 1984).
107 The effect of applying both the Franklin principle and the potentially abusive situa-
tion rules to an obligation without adequate stated interest is unclear. If the issue price of
an obligation is determined by reference to the present value of all payments due under
the obligation, per § 1274(b)(1), and the issue price exceeds the value of the property, an
application of Franklin to that issue price leads to the conclusion that the obligation will
not be respected as debt. This order of analysis-applying § 1274 first and then Franklin-
minimizes the cases in which § 1274(b)(3) has any impact because the debt must be ig-
nored rather than reduced. This is a harsh application of the law because the applicable
federal rate (AFR) is lower than the rate at which many borrowers must finance their
acquisitions. This problem arises in OID obligations, as well as restructured obligations.
On the other hand, application of § 1274(b)(3) prior to application of the Franklin prin-
ciple means that there will never be an obligation that fails to meet the Franklin standard
because the issue price necessarily will be reduced to the point at which it no longer ex-
ceeds the value of the property.
It is unclear what function the potentially abusive situation rules were meant to serve,
but the most appropriate role for them is to designate a greater amount as interest than
would be so designated under § 1274(b)(1). Such a result would be appropriate in situa-
tions where the AFR is not sufficiently high in light of either the borrower's creditworthi-
ness, or the risk of decline in value of the collateral securing a nonrecourse debt. If
§ 1274(b)(3) were limited to this role, both it and Franklin would retain lasting vitality.
108 If the new instrument is not debt, the purported obligor will not be entitled to inter-
est deductions under § 163 for payments under the new instrument. Denial of interest
deductions is independent of any effects on the taxpayer's basis in the securing property.
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From a traditional debt-equity perspective, the restructured instru-
ment looks more like an interest in the property than an obligation of
the debtor.10 9 The debtor would rather walk away from the property
than satisfy the excessive debt, so the presumption about nonrecourse
debt-that the instrument is debt of the borrower, rather than an obli-
gation attaching to the property-is unfounded; without the property,
the obligation would be totally unenforceable. In fact, the debtor has
no reasonable expectation of developing an ownership interest in the
property if the outstanding debt is sufficiently greater than the pro-
jected value of the property at the time the debt must be satisfied.110
The lender bears the risk of loss and, at this point, also has sole inter-
est in any appreciation up to the principal amount of the debt."'
If the restructured instrument must be treated as an ownership in-
terest of the lender in the property, the borrower's basis in the under-
lying property is questionable. The debtor included the nonrecourse
debt in basis at acquisition of the property on the assumption that the
debt would be satisfied. A recharacterization of the debt as an owner-
ship interest of the lender in the property proves that assumption to
have been false. Even where the taxpayer satisfies the debt subse-
quent to the restructuring, characterization of the instrument as the
lender's ownership interest on the restructuring is still correct under
current law because advance credit for satisfaction of the new instru-
ment is unwarranted where the taxpayer has no equity in the property
at the time that instrument is created. 112
109 See note 72. While the legal standards for distinguishing debt and equity for tax
purposes have developed in the context of corporate debt, some of the factors applied in
that context are relevant to debt secured by property as well. For example, participation in
both the success and failure of a venture indicates an equity participation, while a right to
enforce payment of the entire sum of the obligation on default indicates indebtedness.
Thin capitalization in the corporate context is comparable to a lack of equity cushion in the
property context, and an obligation of contingent amount is comparable to a nonrecourse
mortgage that is inadequately secured.
110 See Terry, note 41, at 325 (analogizing obligor of nonrecourse debt in excess of prop-
erty's fair market value to holder of put option to sell property at exercise price equal to
nonrecourse debt payable at maturity). While the borrower may have possession of the
property, such possession is consistent with a simple lease arrangement and does not prove
that the borrower has any ownership interest in the property. This was the government's
contention in Mayerson v. Commissioner, 47 T.C. 340,340 (1966). Any payment pursuant
to the "debt" is, in this model, payment of rent. See text accompanying notes 171-73.
111 The Service has blessed the debt characterization of shared appreciation mortgages
only in the context of residential, recourse indebtedness, see Rev. Rul. 83-51, 1983-1 C.B.
48, but will not rule on other types of mortgages, see Rev. Proc. 94-3, 1994-1 C.B. 447, 448.
112 This is similar to contingent debt, which is not included in basis until satisfied,
whether recourse or nonrecourse. See Denver & Rio Grande W. R.R. v. United States,
505 F.2d 1266, 1269-71 (Ct. C1. 1974); Albany Car Wheel Co. v. Commissioner, 40 T.C. 831,
841 (1963), aff'd per curiam, 333 F.2d 653 (2d Cir. 1964); Redford v. Commissioner, 28 T.C.
773, 778 (1957); Rev. Rul. 78-29, 1978-1 C.B. 62.
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Once the new instrument is characterized as the lender's ownership
interest, it would be inconsistent to allow the borrower to continue
depreciating the property on an undiminished basis. Either the pur-
chaser should be divested of basis (if he has sufficient basis) to the
extent that the debt does not represent cost,113 or the purchaser
should bear the tax cost of that basis by including the basis in in-
come.114 If the restructuring did not affect the purchaser's basis in the
property, the debt would be treated inconsistently-failing to exist for
purposes of allowing interest deductions, while continuing to exist as
part of the purchaser's investment in the property. If the instrument is
not a debt, it is not a financial commitment to the property and it no
longer can be part of the purchaser's cost of that property.
To be consistent, the new instrument must be treated as an owner-
ship interest for all purposes. After the restructuring, the lender is
considered the owner of the property for tax purposes and the pur-
chaser is treated as having transferred the property to the lender in
satisfaction of the debt. A transfer of property in satisfaction of a
debt is always a realization event for both the property and the
debt,115 and a transfer of collateral to the lender is equivalent to a
foreclosure. Because the lender is not the seller, the foreclosure is not
entitled to nonrecognition treatment." 6 Instead, the creditor is
treated as having received the value of the property in exchange for
the note. Because that value is less than the note, the creditor is enti-
tled to a loss equal to the difference." 17
Going forward, the creditor has a tax cost depreciable basis equal to
the value of the property. The borrower has satisfied the indebted-
ness with the property in a transaction qualifying as a sale or ex-
change. Because the debt is nonrecourse, the debtor has no COD
income, but includes the entire amount of the outstanding debt as
113 For example, if the purchaser had invested $1 in cash and the restructured debt is in
the amount of $9 when the value of the property is only $5, the purchaser's basis should be
reduced to $1, further adjusted down for depreciation already claimed. Because this Arti-
cle does not advocate this solution, it does not resolve the difficulties associated with this
approach, such as negative basis and depreciation recapture, which would arise if prior
depreciation claimed had been in excess of $1.
114 This is the cancellation of indebtedness result: The borrower includes the forgiven
amount in income, providing tax cost to the extent of the inclusion, and therefore, support-
ing continued depreciation deductions. Once included, the cancelled debt is the same as
any other after-tax funds. Because of the time value of money, a taxpayer is not indifferent
to inclusion now and deduction later (or deduction now and inclusion later).
115 The debt is extinguished and any gain or loss on the property is recognized. See
United States v. Davis, 370 U.S. 65, 68-71 (1962); Kenan v. Commissioner, 114 F.2d 217,
219-20 (2d Cir. 1940).
116 See IRC § 1038(a).
117 See IRC § 166(a).
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amount realized on the sale.1 18 The amount of the debtor's gain (or
loss) depends on her § 1011 adjusted basis in the property at the time
of the workout.119 In a foreclosure, all incidents of ownership are
shifted to the lender; after foreclosure, the borrower owns nothing
and is not entitled to basis in the property.120
IV. SEPARATING THE PREALIZATION EVET FOR THE PROPERTY FROM
THE REAUZATION EVENT FOR THE DEBT
In one sense, the results under current law are perfectly acceptable
in that they bring the tax treatment of the lender-borrower relation-
ship closer to measuring income more accurately after the restructur-
ing than it was before. Foreclosure treatment recognizes that the loss
has been borne by the lender.'21 Using the restructuring to adjust the
relative tax positions of the parties, however, makes the restructuring
a major tax event, which may be burdensome to both borrowers and
lenders.1 2 This Section considers the argument that can be made for
treating the debt and the property separately, so that the restructuring
is treated as a realization event for the debt, consistent with the con-
clusions reached in Section III, but without constituting a realization
event with respect to the securing property. Since the realization with
respect to the debt is the event that implicates the property, it would
be possible legislatively to exclude the property from the realization
event, despite the workout, without repudiating the entire realization
118 See Commissioner v. Tufts, 461 U.S. 300, 317 (1983); Reg. § 1.1001-2(a). As com-
mentators have noted, it might be more appropriate to treat both sides of the transaction
consistently and bifurcate the analysis into its asset and liability components for the bor-
rower-transferor. Under a bifurcated approach, the debtor would realize the value of the
property on the sale and COD income to the extent the debt exceeds the value of the
property. See Cunningham, note 54, at 577-78; Geier, note 54, at 116-21.
119 See IRC § 1001(a).
120 While no longer entitled to depreciation, a borrower who remains in possession of
the property may have deductions to the extent she compensates the lender-owner for use
of the property and income to the extent she earns any from the property. For a further
discussion of the tax consequences to a borrower in possession when the lender is treated
as an owner of the property, see notes 171-76 and accompanying text.
121 The fact that the loss might be temporary does not change the accuracy of this char-
acterization at the time of the restructuring. While it may be true that some critics of
Crane have placed too much significance on the legal risk of loss, where a loss actually has
occurred and a restructuring clearly allocates the loss, the economic burdens fall on the
lender. Cf. Shaviro, Risk and Accrual, note 1, at 419 (arguing that no allocation of nonre-
course deductions can have substantial economic effect); Stephen G. Utz, Partners in
Crane: Partnership Investment and Economic Risk, 31 Tax Notes 827 (May 26,1986) (ar-
guing that partnership regulations should take account of the fact that legal allocation of
risk is not perfect proxy for determining who bears actual economic risk).
122 For lenders, the burden may arise from nontax consequences that may follow from
the tax consequences, such as financial statement adjustments and regulatory restrictions
about property ownership.
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system. I conclude that there is no compelling policy justification for
treating the debt and property inconsistently and therefore an over-
haul of the treatment of nonrecourse debt is desirable.
The policies behind the realization requirement do not provide any
persuasive reason to treat the restructuring as a realization event with
respect to the debt, but not with respect to the property.123 The cur-
rent income tax is based on a realization rather than an accrual sys-
tem-which would measure income more precisely-largely for
reasons of administrability and cash flow.124 Realization eases admin-
istration because it relieves taxpayers and the government from the
burden of valuing all property every year to determine whether the
property has increased or decreased in value, as would be required in
an accrual tax. Delaying tax until realization, which most often occurs
on the sale of property, also prevents the imposition of tax at an illiq-
uid time. Assuming these policies are important,'2 neither would be
promoted significantly by excluding the property in the restructuring
from the realization event that affects the debt. The case for revisiting
the basic approach to nonrecourse debt is not weakened by these
interests.
The valuation burden at the time of the restructuring is not in-
creased by treating the restructuring as a realization event for the
property, because whenever a debt modification takes place, the par-
ties must value the securing property to determine the terms of the
restructured instrument. The lender must weigh restructuring against
foreclosure, and both parties must calculate an appropriate reduction
in the borrower's obligation. Thus, in every restructuring, the value of
the property at least must be approximated.
The cash flow justification for the realization requirement likewise
fails to support arbitrary separation of the debt realization from the
property realization. Under current law, even if the property were
123 If the changes to the instrument are significant, a debt modification must be treated
as a realization event to prevent manipulation of the realization rule. A realization cannot
depend upon the formal distinction between exchanging new pieces of paper and modify-
ing an existing one. In interpreting Cottage Say. Ass'n v. Commissioner, 499 U.S. 554
(1991), which involved an actual exchange, Treasury recognized that the substantive stan-
dard for a realization had to be consistent for actual exchanges and deemed exchanges.
See Preamble to Prop. Reg. § 1.1001-3, 57 Fed. Reg. 57,034 (1992). While a higher thresh-
old for reissuance would reduce the frequency of the restructuring-as-foreclosure problem,
it would not solve it completely because a significant modification to a debt instrument
would constitute a reissuance under § 1001.
124 This is the widely accepted justification for the realization requirement. Marvin A.
Chirelstein, Federal Income Taxation: A Guide to the Leading Cases and Concepts 72 (7th
ed. 1994).
125 Some commentators do not believe they are. See Deborah H. Schenk, Taxing Equity
Derivatives: A Partial Integration Proposal, 51 Tax L. Rev. 571, 635-37 (1995); Shakow,
note 59, at 1114 (both suggesting liquidity and valuation concerns are overblown).
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protected from realization, the restructuring nevertheless might pres-
ent a cash flow hardship to the taxpayer, since immediate COD in-
come might result from the debt realization in the workout.126
Furthermore, the immediate tax resulting from a deemed disposition
of the property in exchange for the debt might be less than the imme-
diate tax from the COD on a deemed debt-for-debt exchange (or from
treating the restructuring only as a realization event with respect to
the debt).127
In sum, the policies behind the realization rule do not make a com-
pelling case for treating a restructuring as a realization event for the
debt but not the property. The problem under current law arises be-
cause the restructuring presents an opportunity to correct prior mis-
characterizations, not because the law mischaracterizes the workout
itself. If the transaction had been treated accurately at the outset, the
restructuring would not necessitate an abrupt adjustment of the tax
consequences so they comport with economic reality.
V. PROBLEMS WITH CuRRE r TAx TRFATNm'-r OF
NONRECOuRSE DEBT
This Section explains why the current treatment of nonrecourse
debt is unacceptable, both in the restructuring example and more gen-
erally. It argues that the treatment of a restructuring creates unneces-
sary hardship for debtors and unexpected consequences for lenders.
It also surveys some of the classic difficulties presented by the use of
nonrecourse debt. The vexation that has been caused by nonrecourse
debt-the classic abuses and the restructuring problem highlighted
here, as well as the uncertainty and complexity it has spawned-re-
12 COD income might be deferred under § 108. This does not affect the realization of
discharge of indebtedness income under § 61(a)(12), although that income could be con-
verted into gain on disposition of the property. See Kimberly S. Blanchard, Discharge of
Nonrecourse Debt: A Reexamination of the Distinction Between Recourse and Nonre-
course Debt and Related Issues, 50 Tax Notes 773, 775 (Feb. 18, 1991).
127 For example, if the debt is $10, the borrower's basis in the property is S7, the value of
the property has fallen to $5, and the issue price of the new debt is determined to be $5
under § 1274, the taxpayer has immediate taxable income of $5 (S1 debt deemed satisfied
with payment of $5), which is ordinary income because it is characterized as COD income
rather than gain. See IRC § 61(a)(12). On the other hand, if the debt is deemed cancelled
by a transfer of the property to the creditor, the borrower only has income of S3 (S10 debt
less $7 basis). The borrower has less tax on the transaction under the latter characteriza-
tion because the deemed transfer nets the COD income against the disposition loss on the
property. See IRC § 7701(g) (providing that fair market value of property subject to non-
recourse indebtedness shall not be less than amount of such indebtedness); Reg. § 1.1001-
2(a) (including in amount realized from sale or other disposition of property the amount of
liabilities from which transferor is discharged as result of sale or disposition).
The borrower is in a less advantageous tax position in the transfer example only in that
he will not be entitled to future depreciation deductions with respect to the property.
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lates back to the true-debt approach and its failure accurately to mea-
sure income.
A. Debt Into Equity
Current law deters restructurings because they terminate the fa-
vored tax treatment generally granted to nonrecourse borrowers. This
deterrence effect exists regardless of whether the restructured instru-
ment is characterized as the lender's equity interest in the property or
debt, as in the straight-debt modification. Thus, a restructuring is only
one of many examples in which the Crane rule, though advantageous
for borrowers at first, eventually may lead to hardship. Whether the
restructured instrument is treated as equity or debt, the tax conse-
quences may be burdensome: If the restructured instrument is equity,
the debtor will have gain or loss on the disposition of the property and
will be divested of its tax ownership, including depreciation deduc-
tions.' z8 On the other hand, if the instrument is debt, the debtor may
have significant COD income.129
It is inefficient for the tax law to deter restructurings that the parties
otherwise would accomplish. Debt must be restructured when the
cost of servicing it leaves the debtor with insufficient funds to operate
the property. Restructurings prevent foreclosures, and, therefore,
keep property in the hands of those who have an interest in operating
it. Furthermore, restructurings of troubled debt should be encouraged
so that the financial statements of lenders properly reflect the value of
their loan portfolios; a restructuring that reduces the amount of a loan
should be reflected as a lesser asset on the financial institution's
books.130
128 See Subsection III.D.2.
129 The tax consequences to the debtor may be either more or less burdensome if the
restructured instrument is characterized as lender's equity instead of debt, so the choice
between debt and equity does not favor necessarily either the interest of taxpayers in mini-
mizing tax or the interest of the government in maximizing revenue. The relative burdens
depend upon when the restructuring takes place during the depreciable life of the property
and the amortization schedule of the debt. For example, where the restructuring takes
place early in the borrower's holding, before any mortgage amortization and little depreci-
ation has been allowed, if the new instrument is characterized as equity, the gain may be
small while the loss of future deductions may be large. Alternatively, if there has been
significant mortgage amortization and depreciation allowed prior to the restructuring,
there could be a loss realized on the restructuring, but little forgone depreciation, if the
new instrument is characterized as equity. Conversely, if the restructured instrument is
characterized as debt, the debtor will continue to be entitled to the depreciation deductions
on the property, but may recognize COD income on the restructuring without any offset-
ting loss for the economic decline in the value of the property that necessarily would have
occurred prior to the workout.
130 While foreclosure would achieve this goal as well, a restructuring can achieve this
goal with far fewer consequences.
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A restructuring shows how easily an instrument can be transformed
from debt into equity, largely by operation of law, rather than by ma-
jor change in the terms of the instrument. That transformation can
take place so readily because there is little substance that distinguishes
nonrecourse debt secured by property from an ownership interest in
that property-the lender's interest was very much like an ownership
interest all along. Nevertheless, the tax law places great importance
on that distinction by awarding all depreciation deductions to the
owner of the property. A restructuring is a major tax event because it
must be treated as a foreclosure to bring the tax treatment into line
with the economic relationship of the parties. A better reflection of
income for the duration of the transaction would require less adjust-
ment later, and a better system would provide for major tax conse-
quences to flow from major business transactions and minor tax
consequences to flow from less significant transactions. 131 If the non-
recourse debt had been considered an investment by the lender,
rather than by the borrower at the outset, as Section VI describes, a
restructuring would have no tax consequences at all.
A restructuring illustrates the breakdown of the true-debt approach
to nonrecourse debt, but it certainly does not represent the entire ex-
tent of the problem with current law's treatment of nonrecourse debt.
As the next Section describes, the tax treatment of nonrecourse debt
has led to considerable abuse, uncertainty and complexity. A workout
simply provides an additional reason to reject the Crane rule's treat-
ment of acquisition indebtedness as part of the purchaser's cost of ac-
quired property.
B. Implications Outside Restructurings
This Section argues that the true-debt approach has none of the ad-
vantages that the Crane court expected it would have and many disad-
vantages. First, the Crane rule stimulated abusive avoidance behavior:
Inclusion of nonrecourse debt in basis encouraged taxpayers to inflate
nonrecourse debt in transactions involving seller financing, and to ar-
range their affairs so that tax benefits from property flowed to high
bracket taxpayers. 132 Second, the Franklin test, which depends on a
131 The Crane rule was acceptable for bona fide real estate deals in an environment of
continually rising values in which it was easy to presume that a purchaser would have
reasons to satisfy an excessive debt. See generally Martin B. Cowan, Is Any Part of a
Nonrecourse Mortgage Greatly Exceeding FMV Includable in Basis?, 77 J. Tax'n 260,264
(1992); Utz, note 121, at 829 n.13. In an era of falling values, nonrecourse debt presents a
real economic burden to lenders. See Vandell et al., note 39, at 451 (stating that in 1992
commercial mortgage foreclosures were at their highest levels since the Depression).
132 See, e.g., Bailey v. Commissioner, 993 F.2d 288, 292-94 (2d Cir. 1993) (disregarding
purported nonrecourse debt); Estate of Baron v. Commissioner, 798 F2d 65,63-71 (2d Cir.
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determination of value, negates the certainty of Crane's black letter
rule that would treat all debt alike. And finally, Congress added con-
siderable complexity to the treatment of nonrecourse debt with § 465,
and more generally, § 469, undermining the simplicity and adminis-
trability of the Crane rule itself. These problems all could be allevi-
ated by revisiting the true-debt approach and replacing it with a more
accurate system of income measurement.
1. Cost Recovery and Deduction Shifting
The true-debt approach distorts income because it allows cost re-
covery where there has been no cost and thereby encourages deduc-
tion shifting among taxpayers.133 A taxpayer is entitled to basis equal
to the cost of property.'3 Depreciation is a corollary to cost basis
1986) (same); Brountas v. Commissioner, 692 F.2d 152, 156-61 (1st Cir. 1982), cert. denied,
462 U.S. 1106 (1983); Gibson Prods. v. Commissioner, 637 F.2d 1041, 1046-49 (5th Cir.
1981); Rose v. Commissioner, 88 T.C. 386, 415-22 (1987), aff'd, 868 F.2d 851 (6th Cir.
1989).
133 This is the traditional tax shelter debate. Preferences are purposeful, congressional
enactments, and yet, certain uses of those preferences are considered abusive, and have
been curtailed by both the courts and subsequent congressional action. For a discussion of
the relationship between preferences and tax shelters, see Zelenak, note 37, at 588-89 (con-
cluding that there is no justification for eliminating tax shelters while retaining preferences
in Code). This Article takes no position on this issue.
134 IRC § 1012. Cost has been interpreted to mean the taxpayer's investment in the
property-whether in the form of cash, other property exchanged or liabilities assumed
with respect to the acquired property. See United States v. Hendler, 303 U.S. 564, 566
(1938) (holding that assumption and payment of debt obligation of transferor by transferee
in corporate reorganization produces taxable income to transferor); Blackstone Theatre
Co. v. Commissioner, 12 T.C. 801,804-05 (1949) (holding that transferee's basis in property
includes tax liens thereon); Reg. § 1.1012-1(a) ("In general, the basis of property is the cost
thereof. The cost is the amount paid for such property in cash or other property.").
Cost includes recourse liabilities because they represent a commitment to the property
that the purchaser is required to make, even though such liabilities do not represent a
current cash cost (or tax paid cost) of the acquired property. Assignment of basis for any
debt, therefore, provides the debtor a time value advantage that the purchaser for cash
does not have. Depreciable basis attributable to recourse liabilities is a tremendous benefit
to the taxpayer-borrower who is entitled to deductions prior to the payment of tax on the
income used to satisfy the liabilities. See George Cooper, The Taming of the Shrewd:
Identifying and Controlling Income Tax Avoidance, 85 Colum. L. Rev. 657, 716 (1985)
(arguing that leverage is cause of tax sheltering activities and recommending that preferen-
tial deductions be allowed only for cash-supported basis); Michael T. Madison, Initial Pit-
falls Associated With Use of the Limited Partnership 7, 8-11 (unpublished paper presented
at 22d Marshall-Wythe School of Law Tax Conference (Dec. 4, 1976)) (describing how
successful real estate venture can provide tax losses to investors); Martin J. McMahon, Jr.,
Reforming Cost Recovery Allowances for Debt Financed Depreciable Property, 29 St.
Louis U. L.J. 1029, 1034 (1985) (arguing that depreciation deductions on all debt financed
property should be suspended until debt is amortized).
The inequities and the opportunities for abuse, caused by the use of leveraging in gen-
eral is beyond the scope of this Article. The proposal in this Article does not extend to
recourse debt because the proposal stems from an observation about the character of non-
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because it is the method by which investors recover their costs.1 35
Under current law, depreciation deductions serve a dual purpose:
correct measurement of income from transactions that extend beyond
one year in a system with annual accounting periods, and an incentive
to invest in qualifying assets.136 Gradual cost recovery is appropriate
in the name of accurate measurement of income, but a system that
assigns basis to a taxpayer who does not bear the cost of the property
(and may never bear that cost) fails to achieve that goal. Where there
has been no cost for acquiring the property, as where there is no wast-
recourse debt The lender invested in the securing property and there is no need to trace
the proceeds by any artificial means, as current law requires under the interest allocation
rules for recourse liabilities. See Temp. Reg. § 1.163-8T.
135 "ITrhe purpose of depreciation accounting is to allocate the expense of using an asset
to the various periods which are benefited by that asset." Hertz Corp. v. United States, 364
U.S. 122,126 (1960); see also Fribourg Navigation Co. v. Commissioner, 383 U.S. 272,276-
77 (1966) (discussing depreciation and tax-free cost recovery); Massey Motors, Inc. v.
United States, 364 U.S. 92, 96 (1960) (same). Depreciation also can be understood as an
exception to the realization requirement because it allows purchasers to account for the
loss in their property piecemeal, rather than waiting for a disposition of the property. See
United States v. Ludey, 274 U.S. 295, 301 (1927) ("The theory underlying this allowance
for depreciation is that by using up the plant, a gradual sale is made of it."); see also
Cunningham & Schenk, note 14, at 742 (noting that, under current law, taxpayers are per-
mitted to account for anticipated loss in value of certain assets resulting from depreciation
before disposition).
136 A better approach than the one codified in § 168 would separate the two goals of the
present accelerated cost recovery system-matching costs with revenues and fostering in-
vestment-and address each more precisely. A variation on the current schedular ap-
proach could be retained in order to achieve the first goal. Ideally, the rate of depreciation
would be slower and less front-loaded. For a discussion of economic, or sinking fund, de-
preciation, see 2 Treasury Dep't, Tax Reform for Fairness, Simplicity, and Economic
Growth 151-72 (1984); Chirelstein, note 124, at 145-49; Calvin H. Johnson, Soft Money
Investing Under the Income Tax, 1989 U. Ill. L. Rev. 1019. The basic construct of § 16S
could remain, however, categorizing assets by useful life and depreciating based on a
formula. The second goal could be achieved more directly and simply by giving a one time
subsidy to taxpayers to whom Congress desires to give incentives. For example, Congress
could enact an investment tax credit that would give taxpayers an incentive to invest in
certain assets and be measurable in present value terms. Of course, it is not necessary that
the subsidy be administered through the tax system, rather than by direct expenditure.
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ing of the property,137 there should be no depreciation because there
cannot be any decline in the investment or recovery of cost.' 38
Nonrecourse debt represents a contingent, rather than an irrevoca-
ble, commitment to make a future investment in the property. 139
Courts consistently have looked for unconditional obligations in as-
signing basis for debt.140 Even if the taxpayer has equity in the prop-
erty so that he currently has an incentive to treat the nonrecourse debt
the same as recourse debt, without legal compulsion, there is no guar-
antee that subsequent market events will not eliminate that incentive.
Because nonrecourse debt is only a possible future cost of the bor-
rower, on acquisition, it is better characterized as a current cost of the
lender, which may or may not be replaced by a later cost of the
borrower.
The lender is the one who must produce the cash on acquisition,
and must forgo all other opportunities for that investment.' 41 The
economic cost of the property represented by the nonrecourse debt is
137 See Geneva Drive-In Theatre Inc. v. Commissioner, 67 T.C. 764,771-72 (1977), aff'd,
622 F.2d 995 (9th Cir. 1980) (holding that depreciation on future interest does not begin
until that interest becomes possessory, that is, when taxpayer, rather than tenant in posses-
sion, bears burden of economic decline). Section 167(a) authorizes depreciation deduc-
tions only for property that exhausts, suffers wear and tear or becomes obsolete. Certain
property is not considered to do so. See Reg. § 1.167(a)-2 (land not depreciable); Rev.
Rul. 68-232, 1968-1 C.B. 79 (works of art not depreciable). But see Liddle v. Commis-
sioner, 65 F.3d 329 (3d Cir. 1995) (allowing musician to depreciate bass violin even though
instrument increased in value while musician owned it); Simon v. Commissioner, 68 F.3d
41, 44 (2d Cir. 1995) (allowing musicians to depreciate antique violin bows because they
proved that bows suffer wear and tear with use).
138 It is fundamental that the depreciation deduction is allowed upon a capital invest-
ment. Where a taxpayer has no capital investment in property it is not entitled to a
depreciation allowance in respect of the capital asset. The essential requirements of a
capital investment are the laying out of money or money's worth and the acquisition
of something of permanent use or value in the business.
Detroit Edison Co. v. Commissioner, 45 B.T.A. 358, 361 (1941), aff'd, 319 U.S. 98 (1943).
139 See Anderson, note 6, at 1514-15 (arguing that nonrecourse debt is contingent and
therefore should be governed by rules applicable to contingent debt). This Article takes
that observation one step further by redefining the relationship of the lender and the bor-
rower. See Section VI.
140 See Columbus & Greenville Ry. Co. v. Commissioner, 42 T.C. 834 (1964), aff'd per
curiam, 358 F.2d 294 (5th Cir. 1966); Albany Car Wheel Co. v. Commissioner, 40 T.C. 831
(1963), aff'd, 333 F.2d 653 (2d Cir. 1964); Redford v. Commissioner, 28 T.C. 773 (1957).
Similarly, guarantors are denied basis until they actually pay the debt and are unable to
collect from the primary debtor. See Uri v. Commissioner, 949 F.2d 371 (10th Cir. 1991);
Harris v. United States, 902 F.2d 439 (5th Cir. 1990); Brown v. Commissioner, 706 F.2d 755
(6th Cir. 1983); Blum v. Commissioner, 59 T.C. 436 (1972). But see Selfe v. United States,
778 F.2d 769 (11th Cir. 1985) (remanding on instruction that guaranteed obligation should
be included in guarantor's basis if creditor looks primarily to guarantor for repayment); cf.
Estate of Leavitt v. Commissioner, 875 F.2d 420, 426-27 (4th Cir. 1989) (distinguishing
Selfe).
141 Commentators have noted the borrower's opportunity costs in incurring a nonre-
course loan. See Barton, note 89, at 496; Utz, note 121, at 843.
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allocated more accurately to the lender rather than the borrower, as
is, therefore, the § 1012 cost basis. In its focus on ownership as a
proxy for investment, the law has ignored the obvious investor.142
Depreciation, by definition, measures loss rather than profit, and
therefore, it is appropriate to look to the incidence of loss rather than
opportunity for profit in assigning depreciation deductions. If an asset
gives rise to depreciation deductions without actually declining in
value (or "costing" the taxpayer anything), any amount of allowable
depreciation provides the taxpayer with a tax advantage without eco-
nomic detriment.143 Under the current system of cost recovery, tax
depreciation can play an independent role in the marketplace, encour-
aging nontaxable lenders to sell the tax deductions associated with
their economic losses to taxable borrowers. These arrangements 1.4
are beneficial to both the borrower and the lender, at the expense of
the fisc. They are attractive to the lender because it can charge a pre-
mium interest rate on the loan in exchange for the tax benefits to
which the borrower becomes entitled under current law as a conse-
quence of the arrangement. The borrower is willing to pay the pre-
mium for the tax benefits when those benefits more than offset the
premium charged.
This shifting of tax benefits is contrary to congressional intent and is
a problem when it undermines the progressivity of the income tax. 45
Congress has made clear that it intended the Code's incentive to in-
vest in capital assets to be a benefit primarily for targeted taxpayers,
rather than simply an attempt to increase investment in capital assets
142 See Tolins v. Commissioner, 22 T.C.M. (CCII) 137, 140-42 (1963) (rejecting seller-
mortgagee's claim to depreciation deductions). The court stated that the mortgagee did
not hold the property for production of income, and therefore, § 167(a) did not authorize a
deduction. See id. at 140. This is an unnecessarily narrow reading of the statute-lenders
do not hold mortgages for amusement.
143 This partially explains why, in a rising market, real estate was so attractive as a tax
shelter although it had a depreciation schedule slower than that for other assets. Whether
property actually is exhausting generally has been administratively determined. See Rev.
Proc. 87-56, 1987-2 C.B. 674 (setting forth asset classes, class lives and recovery periods for
property subject to depreciation under § 168).
144 Although investment in real estate in order to reap tax benefits has declined due to
the operation of §§ 465 and 469, some investors continue to enjoy significant tax deduc-
tions with respect to real estate without economic exposure. See IRC § 465(b)(6) (provid-
ing that taxpayers shall be considered at risk with respect to their share of qualified
nonrecourse financing), § 469(c)(7) (excluding from passive activity categorization certain
rental real estate activities).
145 For a contrary view, see Shaviro, Risk and Accrual, note 1, at 432-39 (arguing that
misallocation of deductions among taxpayers allowed through use of nonrecourse debt is
not problem worth addressing); Sims, note 3, at 298 (supporting free allocation of tax bene-
fits in arm's length negotiation).
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by providing a freely transferable subsidy.146 If Congress had in-
tended to encourage investment in certain assets without regard to the
identity of the recipient of the tax benefits, there would be no eligible
taxpayer requirements, as there are in §§ 465(a)(1) and 469(a)(2).
Those taxpayer limitations evince congressional intent to subsidize
particular taxpayers involved in particular activities, 147 and the restric-
tions as to eligible taxpayers may prevent the full capitalization of tax
savings into the price of tax-preferred assets.148 Similarly, the repeal
of safe harbor leasing is further evidence that Congress is unwilling to
encourage investment by granting taxpayers freely transferable bene-
fits. 149 A system that allows well-advised taxpayers to buy and sell tax
benefits misallocates the tax burden within income classes as well as
across them.
2. Uncertainty
The current true-debt approach also creates uncertainty. The
Franklin rule, which is necessary under current law to prevent the
most blatantly abusive transactions, creates uncertainty because it re-
lies on the audit and litigation process for enforcement. Even a con-
146 The desirability of placing preferences in the Code or limiting those preferences to
certain taxpayers is beyond the scope of this Article, which simply observes that Congress
has chosen to do so. For an economic analysis of this issue, see Daniel N. Shaviro, Selec-
tive Limitations on Tax Benefits, 56 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1189 (1989); see also Robert J. Peroni,
A Policy Critique of the Section 469 Passive Loss Rules, 62 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1 (1988) (de-
nouncing preferences).
147 Although particularly relevant for accelerated cost recovery benefits, taxpayer
targeting is not unique to §§ 465 and 469; the Code also contains provisions directly
prohibiting trafficking in tax benefits and gives the Commissioner tools to prevent shifting
the incidence of tax. See, e.g., IRC § 382 (placing limitations on net operating loss car-
ryforwards and certain built-in losses following corporate ownership change), § 482 (au-
thorizing Secretary to allocate income, deductions, credits or allowances among two or
more organizations, trades or businesses owned or controlled directly or indirectly by the
same interests, if Secretary determines that such allocation is necessary to prevent evasion
of taxes or to clearly reflect income).
148 See Sims, note 3, at 298-311 (concluding that capitalization of tax benefits is incom-
plete, and that restrictions that dampen desire for tax-favored assets are undesirable be-
cause they further impede complete capitalization). If tax benefits are fully capitalized into
the price of the assets, they are not very effective incentives. The fact that there has been
at least some capitalization of tax benefits creates a transition problem for the change of
approach advocated here, as does any other change from the status quo.
149 The story of that provision, former § 168(f)(8), adopted in 1981 and quickly repealed,
Tax Equity Fiscal Responsibilities Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-248, 96 Stat. 324, 442-47,
illustrates Congress' belief that the integrity of the tax system depends on the public's
perception of the system's fairness and Congress' ability to control revenue loss. That
provision stands out as the sole example of Congress' open invitation for the buying and
selling of tax benefits. For further discussion, see Alvin C. Warren, Jr. & Alan J. Auerbach,
Transferability of Tax Incentives and the Fiction of Safe Harbor Leasing, 95 Harv. L. Rev.
1752 (1982).
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scientious and honest borrower cannot be certain that a nonrecourse
obligation that represents a significant part of the purchase price will
be respected as a true debt under the Franklin standard without an
adjudication that determines the value of the property. 50 Conse-
quently, debtors cannot be sure that they are entitled to the tax bene-
fits associated with a purported debt, an important element in
predicting the cash flow from any property. In addition, Franklin's
case-by-case approach is unsatisfactory as a general rule because of
particular transactions like the restructuring described above: Taxpay-
ers may be enjoying depreciation deductions on restructured Franklin-
type debt with impunity because the government has not identified or
challenged those taxpayers. A restructuring presents a significant en-
forcement problem because the government lacks access to the mar-
ket valuation information that the parties have. The task of
identifying those restructurings worth examining and then actually
challenging them would be tremendous.Sl
Without statutory guidance, taxpayers understandably choose the
route of minimum liability and assume that the original borrower con-
tinues to be entitled to the tax benefits associated with the property.
Given the lack of precedent, such an approach is reasonable. Even if
these taxpayers are not engaging in the purposeful abuse that the
prior generation of nonrecourse borrowers attempted, a restructuring
creates the potential for tax avoidance. The problem is addressed best
through legislation designed to protect the fisc and to provide predict-
ability and equal treatment for all taxpayers.
3. Complexity
Finally, the true-debt approach has metamorphosed into a complex
and cumbersome body of law. The simple Crane rule has grown into a
three-tier system, with the rule that treats nonrecourse debt as true
debt as the first tier, the Franklin rule as the second tier, and the at
risk rules the third tier.152 The at risk rules are particularly complex.
150 Section 1.1274-3(b)(2) of the regulations provides that where the purchaser makes a
20% down payment, a nonrecourse debt will be protected from scrutiny under the poten-
tially abusive rules of § 1274(b)(3), but the regulations do not apply in this context. See
IRC § 1274(b)(3) (in case of potentially abusive situation, imputed principal amount of any
debt instrument received in exchange for property shall be fair market value of such prop-
erty adjusted to account for other considerations).
151 This, of course, was also a problem with acquisition debt, which explains why Con-
gress had to adopt § 465. See Section II.
m Although not directly addressing the issue of nonrecourse debt, the passive activity
loss rules of § 469 represent an additional layer of analysis that must be applied after the at
risk rules. The pressure on passive activities would be relieved to some extent if the prob-
lem of nonrecourse debt used in such activities (particularly real estate activities covered
by the exception in § 465(b)(6)) were solved.
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Under § 465, the owner is entitled to all the depreciation deductions
attributable to the securing property, but is not allowed to shelter in-
come from outside the activity with those deductions until they repre-
sent an economic loss actually suffered by the owner with respect to
the property. 153 Thus, in the final analysis, the at risk rules, in a
clumsy stop-gap fashion, attempt to achieve the same goal as the pro-
posal in this Article-to insure that the tax benefits of depreciation
deductions are enjoyed only if the party claiming those deductions
suffers an economic loss.154
The at risk rules are also unnecessarily harsh in that they com-
pletely disallow depreciation deductions over time as the property de-
teriorates. If insufficient income from the property is realized by an
owner with an insufficient amount at risk, as the property wastes, the
loss must wait, denying all benefits of the cost recovery system and
making the taxpayer wait until disposition of the property to recover
cost. Clearly, during this period of decline, it is the lender's invest-
ment that is wasting, and suspension thwarts the Code's goal of
matching deductions with income from the property. 155
The approach of § 469 has not been particularly popular. See Bankman, note 37 (recom-
mending repeal of passive loss restrictions and suggesting alternative measures that would
better meet commonly accepted criteria of tax equity); Zelenak, note 37 (concluding that
Congress' attempt to eliminate shelters without eliminating preferences makes little sense).
Section 469 limits some arguably appropriate loss taking because taxpayers are denied
some losses that are suffered economically. See id. at 581-86.
Professor Sims' approach also would make the at risk rules and passive activity rules
unnecessary by disallowing basis for seller financed purchase money debt, see Sims, note 3,
at 366-69, but it would not address the problems that arise out of the arguably nonabusive
situations addressed in this Article.
153 IRC § 465(a). Although aggregation of activities is permitted in certain situations,
the at risk rules apply on an activity-by-activity basis, so that at risk amounts invested in
one activity do not allow the taxpayer to use the depreciation deductions from another
venture financed with nonrecourse debt. IRC § 465(c)(2)(A), (B). The proposed regula-
tions confirm that any gain recognized on disposition of an activity is treated as income
from the activity, against which the taxpayer may offset suspended deductions. Prop. Reg.
§ 1.465-66(a), 44 Fed. Reg. 32,235 (1979).
154 Unfortunately, in the real estate context, the at risk rules do not achieve that goal
because they exempt from their application qualified nonrecourse financing, which, by def-
inition, includes most real estate financing provided by lenders in the business of making
loans. See IRC § 465(b)(6) (providing that taxpayer shall be considered at risk with re-
spect to his share of any qualified nonrecourse financing), § 49(a)(1)(D)(iv) (setting forth
general limitations on type of person from whom taxpayers may borrow qualified nonre-
course financing). Neither the seller nor a lender related to the seller may provide quali-
fied nonrecourse financing. IRC §§ 465(b)(6)(D)(ii) (referencing 49(a)(1)(D)(iv)(II)
(defining "qualified person")).
155 Since lenders are never allowed to depreciate property they finance, even when they
bear current losses, any depreciation of the property in excess of the income it yields off-
sets no one's income under the § 465 scheme. This overtaxes income from property fi-
nanced by nonrecourse debt relative to property financed by recourse debt or cash.
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VI. REDEFINING NormCOURSE DEBT
One way to alleviate many of the problems posed by nonrecourse
debt would be to revisit the Crane rule and reject the true-debt ap-
proach. Crane established this approach before computers revolution-
ized recordkeeping and before the law required taxpayers to keep
track of a wide variety of complex data. 5 6 Its holding relied on the
Supreme Court's view that people would not be able to account for
depreciation on a shifting basis.157 Those administrability concerns,
while substantial in 1947, no longer provide a compelling reason to
permit the tax consequences of nonrecourse debt to diverge so widely
from its economic substance. 58 Additionally, Crane's concern with
matching the borrower's income with costs was misplaced because the
nonrecourse lender is the taxpayer for whom there is a mismatch
under the true-debt approach.159 The lender suffers the wear and tear
on the property without a deduction, and includes all interest on the
assumption that the principal amount of the loan is a nonwasting as-
set, which is simply false in the case of a nonrecourse loan secured by
property that declines in value. While recourse loans and nonrecourse
loans secured by nondepreciable property generally can be catego-
rized as nonwasting assets, nonrecourse loans secured by depreciable
property potentially are wasting assets. 60 If the securing property
does not waste, the problem is the availability of any depreciation al-
lowance, not who claims it161 Finally, the three-tier system shows that
absolute simplicity is long gone from this area of the law.
156 See, e.g., IRC § 469 (passive activity loss and credit limitations), § 1272 (OD rules)
and § 6038A (information required from foreign owned operations).
157 The proposed regulations under the ACRS system of depreciation require adjust-
ments to basis, and consequent recomputation of depreciation, where there is a contingent
purchase price or a discharge of indebtedness that leads to basis adjustment. Prop. Reg.
§ 1.168-2(d)(3), 49 Fed. Reg. 5,940 (1984). Basis redeterminations also produce adjust-
ments under MACRS. See James E. Maule, Depreciation: MACRS and ACRS, 531 Tax
Mgmt. Portfolio (BNA) at A-41 (1994).
158 Presumably, it was also for administrative ease that the Supreme Court considered it
important to choose one, and only one, taxpayer to whom all depreciation deductions
would be assigned.
159 See note 31. The suspension of deductions under §§ 465 and 469 aggravates the dis-
tortion from mismatching that Crane tried to prevent because no one is permitted to ac-
count for the current costs of the property.
160 Of course, there is a risk of default in any loan, which might lead one to conclude
that loans should always be included in income when received and deducted when repaid,
on a consumption tax model, or that borrowed funds should never be included in basis.
See note 134. This Article tries to address a somewhat more limited issue.
161 As Professor Bittker once wrote, "We are told, to be sure, that depreciation 'is a
process of allocation, not valuation,' but if there is no decline in value, what is there to
allocate?" Boris L Bittker, A "Comprehensive Tax Base" as a Goal of Income Tax Re-
form, 80 Harv. L. Rev. 925, 957 (1967) (footnote omitted).
There is a certain irony in the fact that nonrecourse debt commonly is secured by build-
ings, which are deemed by statute to suffer "exhaustion [or] wear and tear." See IRC
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Consistent with these concerns, this Section offers an alternative to
the current law treatment of nonrecourse debt within a realization sys-
tem of taxation that assigns basis to both a borrower and nonrecourse
lender, allowing each depreciation over time, and treating the bor-
rower as the full owner of the property only when his unconditional
commitment to the property has replaced the lender's.
A. Description
I propose redefining nonrecourse debt so as to treat both the lender
and the owner as "investors" in the purchased property. 162 Under this
approach, each would be entitled to basis for her "investment," with
that term having the broadest and most neutral connotation possi-
ble-encompassing both equity-type holders and debt holders. Any-
one making an unconditional commitment to the property would be
entitled to basis for that amount. Cash paid would be the most obvi-
ous investment. Recourse debt also would constitute an investment of
the borrower because it is an unconditional obligation. Although the
lender produces the cash in a recourse loan, it would be reasonable to
treat the borrower as making an investment because she cannot
change her mind later, and it would be too difficult to trace recourse
debt to property accurately.163
In a nonrecourse, third party purchase money loan, where the
lender produces the cash and the borrower makes only a conditional
promise to pay, it is more appropriate to treat the lender as the party
making the investment.'6 In contrast, when a seller finances a
§§ 167(a), 168(c)(1), (e)(2). One would think that rational nonrecourse lenders would be
reticent about lending sums only for the promise of repayment from wasting property.
162 The proposal would make § 465 superfluous. While it would not permit repeal of
§ 469, it would make that section less necessary because it would reduce the opportunities
for abuse that § 469 curtailed. It would allow taxpayers to claim real economic losses from
passive activities, unlike current law. See note 152.
163 See note 134.
164 Because the proposal treats nonrecourse lenders as investors in property, a substitu-
tion of the securing property would constitute a change in the investor's interest. This is
the flip side of a restructuring, which, under the proposal, no longer would constitute a
realization event. Consistent with the approach taken herein, a substitution of property
should be an exchange for tax purposes because once nonrecourse debt no longer is con-
ceived of as an interest of the lender in the debtor, the property is all there is. Similarly, a
post-acquisition, nonrecourse loan secured by the property should be treated as the sale of
an interest in the property, reducing the borrower's investment to the extent that the bor-
rower extracts value out of the property, and giving rise to gain where the value withdrawn
exceeds the borrower's basis. Compare Alvin D. Lurie, Mortgagor's Gain on Mortgaging
Property for More Than Cost Without Personal Liability (Contentions of Taxpayer's Coun-
sel in a Pending Case), 6 Tax L. Rev. 319 (1951) (arguing for immediate recognition of gain
to mortgagor upon placing mortgage without personal liability for amount in excess of cost
of property to be mortgaged), with Woodsam Assocs., Inc. v. Commissioner, 198 F.2d 357,
359 (2d Cir. 1952) (rejecting argument that taxpayer made taxable disposition of property
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purchase on a nonrecourse basis, no investment would be made at
that time by either party by virtue of the nonrecourse obligation,
although the seller would continue her prior investment in the prop-
erty.165 By characterizing all third party, nonrecourse lenders as in-
vestors in property, identifying an interest as a creditor's interest or
owner's interest would lose some of its significance, helping to sim-
plify the law and improve predictability in property transactions.1 "
With nonrecourse debt redefined as co-investment by the lender,
both the lender and borrower would start with basis equal to their
respective investments, consistent with § 1012's understanding of cost
as investment. The deductions would be allocated temporally, in the
order in which the investment wastes.1 67 If depreciation correctly
measured the wasting of an asset, under this system, each investor
when she executed second mortgage for which she was not personally liable for amount in
excess of her basis in such property).
165 This is the situation in Franklin. Because the debtors in that case had no expectation
of satisfying the debt, the amount of the debt was immaterial to the lenders and the bor-
rowers. It was bounded only by the tax benefits that the purchasers could exploit. See
notes 20-25 and accompanying text.
166 This proposal would make it unnecessary to distinguish some forms of debt and eq-
uity, because the lender's interest would be treated the same whether interest vras labelled
as "debt" or "equity." At the same time, it exacerbates the problem of distinguishing non-
recourse debt from recourse debt. While some nonrecourse debt may be very secure (for
example, because the debtor has a substantial equity interest in the securing property),
some recourse debt might be quite insecure (for example, because a debtor is a corpora-
tion holding no assets except the mortgaged property, or because the individual borrower
has no current assets).
Any rule that treats recourse and nonrecourse debt differently must distinguish the two.
Current law already places significant pressure on the distinction between nonrecourse and
recourse debt because deductions arising from nonrecourse debt are subject to the limita-
tions in § 465, while recourse debt generally is exempt. A developed body of law weeding
out debt that is recourse in name only could be called upon in resolving this issue. See,
e.g., Porreca v. Commissioner, 86 T.C. 821 (1986); Davis v. Commissioner, 58 T.C.M.
(CCH) 777 (1989); Lansburgh v. Commissioner, 54 T.C.M. (CCII) 691 (1987).
One possible method for distinguishing recourse from nonrecourse debt would be to
establish a rule that requires minimum assets for an individual or minimum capitalization
for a corporation to enjoy the benefits of recourse debt. See Rev. Proc. 89-12, 1989-1 C.B.
798, 800-01 (specifying conditions under which Service will grant ruling that limited part-
nership will be treated as failing to satisfy conditions that characterize entity as corpora-
tion, including characteristic of limited liability). The greater the equity cushion on the
purchase, the less important the distinction becomes because, for all practical purposes,
very secure nonrecourse debt would be treated the same as recourse debt under this pro-
posal. See note 196 and accompanying text.
Perhaps the only way fully to resolve the problem of distinguishing recourse from nonre-
course debt is to change the tax law's approach to cost recovery for all debt-financed prop-
erty, as has been suggested by Professor McMahon, note 134.
167 This timing of depreciation deductions is consistent with current law treatment of a
present purchase of a future interest in depreciable property. No depreciation is allowed
until the future interest ripens; only then does the purchaser's investment begin to suffer
decline. See Geneva Drive-In Theatre, Inc. v. Commissioner, 67 T.C. 764 (1977), aff'd, 622
F.2d 995 (9th Cir. 1980).
Imaged with the Permission of N.Y.U. Tax Law Review
1995]
HeinOnline  -- 51 Tax. L. Rev. 159 1995-1996
TAX LAW REVIEW
would be entitled to deductions equal only to the economic loss suf-
fered. On the other hand, if depreciation allowed by the Code were
faster than the actual decline in value of depreciable property because
Congress intended to encourage investment in "capital assets"' 68
(such as current § 168), the acceleration would inure to the benefit of
all investors, in relation to their respective costs and the timing of
their losses in relation to one another. Although accelerated cost re-
covery itself is not neutral, this basis sharing would make the tax law
more neutral in an investor's decision whether to use nonrecourse
financing.169
In allocating deductions temporally, this proposal would cause the
tax law's measurement of decline to mirror the parties' allocation of
the property's economic loss. Assuming accelerated depreciation, a
collateral effect of this proposal sometimes would be that the bor-
rower would have a rapid, front-loaded deduction for depreciation of
her investment, providing her with the time value advantage of
quickly deducting her entire investment in an asset that will not waste
economically for a considerable period of time. This advantage would
stem largely from the accelerated nature of depreciation deductions
and would disappear if Congress moved to a system of accurate eco-
nomic depreciation. 170
This proposal focuses on, and departs from, current law primarily
with respect to depreciation because examination of the current treat-
ment of nonrecourse debt reveals the greatest difficulty on the loss
side. The dilemma identified in this Article only collaterally affects
168 1 mean this in the capitalization sense, rather than the characterization sense-assets
that Congress believes represent an investment in the economy.
169 While it is true that this proposal increases the relative attractiveness-from a tax
perspective-of recourse debt, the risk of economic loss is an appropriate price. The tax
benefits of ownership traditionally have depended, at least partially, on the corresponding
risks. In the context of leasing transactions, courts have engaged in a benefits and burdens
analysis to determine the owner of property, the lessor or the lessee, and whether the
purported lessor should be allowed the depreciation deductions attributable to the prop-
erty. See, e.g., Frank Lyon Co. v. United States, 435 U.S. 561 (1978); Hilton v. Commis-
sioner, 74 T.C. 305 (1980), aff'd, 671 F.2d 316 (9th Cir. 1982); Pacific Gamble Robinson v.
Commissioner, 54 T.C.M. (CCH) 915 (1987); Smith v. Commissioner, 50 T.C.M. (CCH)
1444 (1985); Sanborn v. Commissioner, 46 T.C.M. (CCH) 1435 (1983).
170 Another effect of this system would be disparate treatment of taxpayers in economi-
cally equivalent positions, namely those holding property subject to nonrecourse debt and
those holding options on property. This problem is addressed better by revising the treat-
ment of options so that they are taxed in keeping with their economic properties, rather
than taking an open transaction approach to nonrecourse debt. The option construct is not
well suited to large downpayments or gradual amortization, while the approach advocated
here accounts for variations in nonrecourse debt. The proper taxation of options is beyond
the scope of this Article. For further discussion of options, see Bruce Kayle, Realization
Without Taxation? The Not-So-Clear Reflection of Income from an Option to Acquire
Property, 48 Tax L. Rev. 233 (1993).
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the current scheme of income inclusion for property transactions. If
nonrecourse debt was secured by nondepreciable property, neither
the lender nor the borrower would be entitled to any deduction for
wear and tear over the life of the property, and changes in value due
to market fluctuations would be taxed on disposition.
Nevertheless, in modifying the approach to nonrecourse debt, some
fundamental questions arise, apart from depreciation allowances. In
particular, if lenders and borrowers are to be treated as co-investors, it
must be determined how income and deductions will be taxed for the
duration of that relationship. Since the co-investment approach does
not affect the borrower's possession of the property, it is reasonable to
treat the borrower the same as current law would treat any tenant in
possession holding an option to purchase. 171 As long as the borrower
is free to operate the property, he should include all income from that
operation. Like any tenant in possession, the borrower should be en-
titled to a deduction for amounts paid to the lender that are in the
nature of rent for the use of the lender's property. The borrower
would compensate the lender for use of the lender's portion of the
property, with the amount depending on the initial investments made
by the borrower and lender, and the principal amortization of the
loan.
Furthermore, part of the so-called interest payment is an amount
for the option to redeem the property at some time in the future. This
is similar to the periodic payments towards that redemption if the loan
is amortizing. The borrower, therefore, makes three different kinds of
payments, which might be characterized individually for tax pur-
poses.172 While the rent clearly should be deductible, 173 the payments
in the nature of premium for an option or further investment in the
property should be capitalized.1 74 This is because the option premium
would be paid for a benefit to be received in a year after the year in
which it was incurred, in other words, the year in which the borrower
171 See note 41 (describing option aspect of nonrecourse debt). This proposed treatment
of the borrower is consistent with the earlier characterization of the option as the bor-
rower's option to purchase the property, rather than the borrower's option to put the prop-
erty to the lender.
172 1 am indebted to Noel Cunningham for this idea.
173 This assumes the rent was an ordinary and necessary expense of the borrower's busi-
ness under § 162. Concededly, disputes would arise over the proper amount to be treated
as rent. In order to avoid some of these disputes, a statutory or regulatory safe harbor for
rent might be desirable. Such a provision would designate rent according to a published
market rate for various communities and properties or as some percentage of value for
different types of property.
174 This approach is consistent with the approach of § 263A(f)'s treatment of construc-
tion period interest as a capitalized cost, and the Supreme Court's decision in INDOPCO,
Inc. v. Commissioner, 503 U.S. 79 (1992), which required capitalization of expenses associ-
ated with one corporation's acquisition of another's shares.
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chose to redeem or walk away from the property. Any payments in
the nature of investment in the property should become part of the
borrower's basis.
Despite the similarity of the option premium and the mortgage
amortization, an argument also can be made that the premium keeps
the option alive only for the current period, which would suggest that
the option premium should be deductible currently. 175 The advantage
of this latter approach is that it is administered more easily than the
bifurcation approach because the "interest" would be fully deductible
and would not need to be separated into rent and option premium.17 6
Either approach to the treatment of the option premium is theoreti-
cally defensible.
The lender would include the rent in income, as the return on his
investment in the property. While the option premium portion also
might be included currently in the lender's taxable income, it could
remain in suspense until the transaction is closed, following the cur-
rent treatment of options.177 In either case, the option premium pay-
ment would be income to the lender, rather than return of capital,
because it would fail to reduce the borrower's strike price for the
property. Since all funds must pass through the borrower, the source
of the funds is irrelevant. Any further investments made by the bor-
rower would be a return of capital to the lender, reducing the lender's
respective investment in the property along with the corresponding
basis.
Accurately measuring the lender's income from a nonrecourse loan
over time is difficult because the contingent nature of nonrecourse
debt makes predictability of the lender's ultimate return on invest-
ment impossible to determine ex ante. This is true even if the lender's
return is recharacterized as rent and option premium, instead of inter-
est and principal. If the property value declines while the debt is out-
standing and the borrower chooses to walk away from it, inclusion of
interest payments at the stated rate of interest or rents at the market
rate overstates the lender's rate of return with respect to the invest-
ment in the property.178 At the same time, the only truly accurate way
175 See Cunningham & Schenk, note 14, at 787-88.
176 For example, if B invests $40 as a downpayment on property, borrows $60 on a non-
recourse basis from L, and pays L $6 "interest" and $5 "principal" in Year 1, both ap-
proaches would treat the $5 as a capitalized expenditure by B. The first approach would
allocate the $6 between rent and option premium, allowing a deduction only for the for-
mer, while the second approach would allow a deduction for the entire $6.
177 See IRC § 1234; Rev. Rul. 58-234, 1958-1 C.B. 279.
178 Undertaxing nonrecourse lenders is not a problem because the stated interest rate
(or imputed interest rate determined under the OID rules) is the maximum rate of return
to which a nonrecourse lender is entitled. The nonrecourse lender's upside is capped at the
stated return, but her downside may be as large as her investment.
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to measure a lender's income from the property is to wait until the
disposition of the property and determine the overall rate of return (if
any) on the lender's investment. This might require open transaction
treatment, which allows deferral of tax on income that is currently
enjoyed 79 and would spawn a new generation of tax-avoidance trans-
actions unless interest on the deferred tax liability were assessed.'80
An alternative to the wait-and-see approach would reject the realiza-
tion rule and mark to market, or apply the imputed return approach
advocated by Professors Cunningham and Schenk.18' While discard-
ing the realization rule would represent progress toward accurate in-
come measurement on a broader scale, it is not necessary to take such
a radical step in order to address the mismeasurement of income from
nonrecourse debt within the realization system.
While not perfect, the proposal to treat the lender's interest as an
investment in the property goes a significant distance toward reducing
the current distortion in the lender's tax treatment. The lender's re-
turn on a nonrecourse loan always depends on the value of the prop-
erty at some time in the future. If the lender's investment is treated as
a debt, it is presumed to be a nonwasting asset and the law treats the
stated return as the income in excess of the lender's invested capital,
and fully taxes it. This treatment is appropriate if the securing prop-
erty does not suffer wear and tear. If, however, the lender's interest
were treated as an investment in the property, the lender's stated re-
turn from the property would be offset by the statutory or administra-
tive determination of the amount by which the property (and the
lender's investment) wasted. The co-investment approach recognizes
that, like any investor in property, the lender who receives cash flow
from the property is no richer to the extent that the sunk costs for the
property will never be returned; even while the interest is paid, the
principal wastes.
Whereas either current law or the proposed approach may require
some adjustment (for losses) when the transaction is closed, the
179 See Burnet v. Logan, 283 U.S. 404 (1931) (allowing basis recovery prior to any in-
come inclusion where amount realized was contingent); Underhill v. Commissioner, 45
T.C. 489 (1966) (allowing basis recovery prior to any income inclusion where interest-bear-
ing obligations were speculative). Current law generally has rejected the %vait-and-see ap-
proach. See Temp. Reg. § 15A.453-1(d)(2)(iii) (fixing price for installment sale gain
recognition for contingent sales); Reg. § 1.1275-4(c)(4) (contingent debt instruments not
treated as open transactions).
180 See IRC § 453A(c). Even that approach would not guarantee accurate measurement
of income in present value terms because the lender's return would have to be presumed to
have accrued at a fixed rate over the course of the investment, but actually may arise, for
example, from a sharp increase in the property's value at the end of the investment.
181 See Cunningham & Schenk, note 14. While the issues discussed in this Article arise
largely because of the realization rule, the proposal tries to work within the realization
system.
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lender's loss under the true-debt approach arises from a theoretical
flaw-completely failing to recognize the loan as a wasting asset.
Under the co-investment approach, a loss on disposition would arise
from a mismatch between schedular depreciation allowances and ac-
tual market depreciation. Under the true-debt approach, the lender's
income over the course of the investment more likely is overstated
than it would be in the co-investment approach because the former
approach taxes the lender's maximum possible return. The flip side,
of course, is that the borrower's income is likely to be understated in
the true-debt approach, which explains why so many tax shelters were
built on nonrecourse debt.
B. Application
To illustrate the operation of this proposal, consider the following:
Example 2: B purchases depreciable real estate for $10 mil-
lion, $1 million of his own money and $9 million borrowed
from L on a nonrecourse basis.182 As the property is oper-
ated, L is entitled to periodic payments and B is entitled to
whatever is left from the property after L is paid.
Each would include in income the amounts received from the prop-
erty-L the rent and the option premium, and B the income in excess
of current expenses.183 In order to produce that income, each has cer-
tain costs, including the investment that each originally made to fi-
nance the property and the periodic investments B makes towards
complete ownership of the property. Depreciation on the property is
the tax law's way to measure those costs, and to allow for them over
time.
If, on default, L is entitled to the first $9 million of value from the
property, B's $1 million investment is lost before L's as the property
182 For simplicity of discussion, L and B are assumed to be individuals. A partnership of
borrowers or lenders would be treated similarly, with participants claiming their allocable
shares of income and deductions. Any pool of investors could allocate the tax attributes
discussed here to the extent that they are shared in such an arrangement. The proposal
would affect investments in mortgage-backed securities to the extent that nonrecourse debt
no longer would constitute an acceptable investment, for example, a qualified mortgage
under the REMIC rules. See IRC § 860G(a)(3). There is, however, no reason why the
characterization of nonrecourse debt advocated here would preclude securitization.
183 For example, if B makes a $200 payment to L, $90 as rent, $10 as option premium
and $100 as further investment, the payment could have the following consequences, con-
sistent with the discussion above: B could deduct the $90 of rent as an ordinary and neces-
sary current expense, and capitalize the option premium and the further investment,
increasing B's depreciable basis in the property by $110. L could include the $100 rent and
premium in current income, and increase depreciable basis for the $100 investment.
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suffers decline. Therefore, B suffers the first $1 million decline in
value of the property, leading to the conclusion that whenever the
lender's interest was superior to the borrower's, the borrower would
be entitled to the first tranche of depreciation deductions. The first $1
million is B's cost of producing income because the contract allocates
the first $1 million economic decline to her.18 After B's interest has
fully depreciated, as the property continues to decline, L's investment
begins to waste, and therefore, L would be entitled to all subsequent
depreciation.
The most that B can lose on this transaction is S1 million so it is
appropriate that B's depreciation deductions should be capped at that
amount. Any loss in the property's value beyond that is borne by the
nonrecourse lender.18s As long as the depreciation schedule accu-
rately measured decline in value, the system would not allow deduc-
tion shifting because every deduction would be accompanied by an
economic loss suffered by the party entitled to the deduction. 186
L and B would start with a $9 million and a $1 million basis, respec-
tively. If, as under current law, the property has a 39-year recovery
period' 87 and the applicable recovery method is straight line,188 the
total annual depreciation allowable is $256,410 (ignoring conven-
tions). The parties would share that allowance as follows:
184 The terms of each financing would determine the ordering of the parties' deprecia-
tion allowances. For example, if a nonrecourse loan were subordinate to a recourse loan,
the recourse loan would be treated as the buyer's commitment to the property, but the
nonrecourse lender would be entitled to the earlier tranche of depreciation deductions,
because the proposal awards the first tranche of depreciation to the investor whose interest
wastes first.
185 This concept is not new to the tax law. This is the theory underlying the regulations
promulgated under § 704(b). See Reg. § 1.704-2(b)(1) (providing that allocations of losses
or deductions attributable to partnership nonrecourse liabilities cannot have economic ef-
fect because creditor alone bears any economic burden that corresponds to those alloca-
tions). Nonrecourse debt in the partnership context has caused so much difficulty precisely
because the treatment of nonrecourse debt has been noneconomic.
186 If the depreciation schedule were accelerated, B's deductions would be allowed ear-
ier than necessary to measure income accurately, but that does not affect the accuracy of
the ordering suggested here. Pro rata deductions for both the lender and the borrower
from the inception of the transaction would not measure income as accurately as temporal
allocation. A pro rata system would overtax borrowers and undertax lenders because the
lender's investment suffers no loss from a decline in the property until the property's value
dips below the amount that the lender has invested; as long as the property is worth at least
$9 million, L enjoys an undiminished asset. To allow L immediately to begin claiming
depreciation deductions would allocate a cost to L that he would not bear at that time.
187 See IRC § 168(c)(1).
188 See IRC § 168(b)(3)(A).
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Year B's allowance L's allowance
1 $256,410 0
2 256,410 0
3 256,410 0
4 230,770 $25,640
5-39 0 256,410
B would be entitled to all the depreciation until his investment was
fully recovered, which would occur in Year 4. L then would begin to
depreciate her interest.189 If the actual decline in value of the
property matched the depreciation schedule and the property were
sold at the beginning of Year 5, B would receive none of the proceeds
of the sale and L would recover almost her full investment. 190 If,
instead, the property were not sold and no payments were made on
the debt for the rest of the recovery period, L would be the only one
entitled to future cost recovery because she would incur all further
cost and loss in value of the property.
Example 3: Assume in Example 2, that B pays $1 million in
principal in Year 2.
The depreciation schedule would change because L's investment
would be reduced to $8 million before L began to account for cost
recovery. B would be entitled to all cost recovery for Years 1-6, and L
only begins to recover her investment in Year 7, after B has recovered
his $2 million investment.19' Basis adjustments must be made for in-
creases (B) and decreases (L) in investment due to principal payments
made, as well as depreciation claimed.
As another possibility, B might pay the principal after L already
had deducted the cost represented by that principal payment.
Example 4: No principal payments are made until Year 10,
when B repays the $9 million loan in full.
The cost recovery allowances would be the same as in Example 2,
but in Year 10, L's investment would be extinguished and B again
would have an investment to recover. At the start of Year 10, B's
basis would be zero (since B fully recovered his cost in the early years)
189 L would have a deductible loss under § 165 (not a bad debt deduction under § 166)
to the extent of any shortfall over her depreciated amount.
190 Annual adjustments in the depreciation schedule would be necessary to conform to
the annual accounting period.
191 B would be entitled to a $256,410 cost recovery deduction for Years 1-7 and a
$205,130 deduction in Year 8 for a total of $2 million. L would be entitled to a $51,280
deduction in Year 8 and a $256,410 deduction for Years 9-39 for a total of $8 millon.
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and L's basis would be $7,692,310 ($9 million original basis reduced by
depreciation of $1,307,690 claimed in Years 4-9). When B paid L $9
million, L would have gain to the extent that the payment is greater
than L's unrecovered cost, or $1,307,690.192 Going forward, B would
have a $9 million investment to be recovered over the remaining 30
years of the property's useful life, at the rate of $300,000 per year.193
192 This gain would be in the nature of recapture and should have the same character as
the depreciation allowances claimed.
193 The calculations get slightly more complicated if the loan is amortized every year.
For example, if $100,000 of the principal is paid at the start of every year for the first nine
years, with the balance paid at the start of Year 10, the depreciation schedule would be as
follows:
B L
Year Basis Recovery Basis Recovery
start $1,000,000 S9,000,000
1 1,100,000 $256,410 8,900,000 0
2 943,590 256,410 8,800,000 0
3 787,080 256,410 8,700,000 0
4 630,660 256,410 8,600,000 0
5 474,250 256,410 8500,000 0
6 317,840 256,410 8,400,000 0
7 161,540 161,540 8,300.000 S94.870
8 100,000 100,000 8,105,130 156,410
9 100,000 100,000 7,848,720 156,410
10 8,100,000 270,000 0 0
11 7,843,590 270,000 0 0
In Year 10, L would recognize $407,690 recapture gain because L's basis at the beginning
of Year 10 would be $7,692,310, and the payment of $8,100,000 would wipe out all remain-
ing basis, plus require recapture of prior depreciation deductions claimed. At the same
time, B's investment would increase, and B essentially would get to claim L's recaptured
amount as depreciation over the remaining recovery period of the asset.
During some years of amortization, both B and L would be entitled to depreciation
deductions because B's principal payments would give rise to immediate investment that is
subject to loss. Because the total depreciation allowed in Years 7-9 would exceed B's in-
vestment, including the payments made in those years, part of the depreciation in those
years would be allocable to L. If B had paid S350,000 of principal in Year S. for example, B
would have sufficient investment to claim all the depreciation allowed that year, instead of
sharing it with L.
Property subject to declining balance cost recovery also could be depreciated under this
system. For example, if five-year property purchased with the same composition of debt
and cash as the real property above, were to be depreciated under § 168(b)(1) (ignoring
conventions), with S1 million principal paid each year and a balloon payment after the end
of the recovery period, the depreciation schedule would be as follows:
B L
Year Basis Recovery Basis Recovery
start $1,000,000 S9,000,000
1 2,000,000 $2,000,000 8,000,000 $2,000,000
2 1,000,000 1,000,000 5,000,000 1,400,000
3 1,000,000 1,000,000 2,600,000 440,000
4 1,000,000 1,000,000 1,200,000 100,000
5 1,000,000 1,000,000 100,000 100,000
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If the property became worthless in Year 20, the loss would fall en-
tirely on B.
This system would allow B to manipulate the timing of his deprecia-
tion deductions because he could choose when to pay the principal
amount of the loan. The Crane Court, in rejecting shifting basis was
concerned that "the mortgagor would acquire control over the timing
of his depreciation allowances." 194 The Court, however, did not ex-
plain why this control would have negative consequences, and its con-
cern seems to have been misplaced. While the treatment proposed
here might lead B to pay part of the principal in a high-tax year, that is
no different from B's choosing to place new property in service in a
high-tax year. There seems to be nothing objectionable about B
choosing the year in which to place property in service based on tax
savings, as long as the property actually is placed in service. Similarly,
B's control over the timing of his depreciation deductions is accepta-
ble if the timing depends upon a real financial commitment. Perhaps
Congress is not as concerned about B's control as was the Supreme
Court, since B already can control the timing of his depreciation al-
lowances by electing an alternative method under § 168.195 As under
all the § 168 depreciation schedules, my proposal would never allow B
to accelerate deductions more than the Code ordinarily allows, which,
if possible, would be a valid concern because it would invite tax shel-
tering opportunities.
The proposal's effect would be felt most significantly in transactions
with little investment by the borrower and large amounts of nonre-
course debt because the borrower's depreciation deductions would
cease shortly after acquisition of the property, unless the principal of
the debt were paid quickly. In a transaction with little nonrecourse
debt and a large cash downpayment by the buyer, there would be little
change from current law. The greater the owner's investment, the
greater the proportion of the total depreciation deductions he would
enjoy, and the longer the period between the purchase and the time
when the lender's investment started to depreciate. In transactions
with significant equity investment by the owner, the actual deprecia-
tion claimed might not differ at all from current law, because the
lender's investment in the property is recovered from the borrower
over time as principal payments are made. Concurrently, the pur-
chaser's investment in the property would increase, along with his de-
preciable basis. If the loan were repaid before the lender began
depreciating the property, the borrower would be entitled to all de-
194 Crane v. Commissioner, 331 U.S. 1, 10 (1947).
195 See IRC § 168(b)(5), (c)(2), (g).
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preciation deductions, as under current law, and basis would not
shift.1 9 6
In seller-financed transactions, nonrecourse debt issued to the
seller-lender ("SL") would not support borrower's basis, but SL
would continue to claim cost recovery allowances for any continuing
investment in the property after the "sale." The seller-financed trans-
action is a good illustration of the co-investment approach because SL
and the buyer may each have concurrent investments in the prop-
erty.197 Unlike current law, which treats SL as having disposed of the
property at the time of this transaction,198 this proposal would treat
SL as having a continuing investment in the property until it was ex-
tinguished by payments received from the buyer. The proposal recog-
nizes, however, that SL's interest in the property would change at the
"sale" in that he no longer would be an owner of the property. Be-
cause the seller's relationship to the property would change at the
sale, it would be appropriate to take stock of that interest on the
"sale" and to adjust SL's depreciation schedule, even though he re-
tained basis. After the "sale," SL really would be in the same position
as the nonrecourse lender-a co-investor with a prior interest in the
property. Consistent with the treatment of the third-party lender,
SL's investment would remain constant while the buyer's interest de-
clined, and would waste again as soon as the buyer's investment had
been depreciated completely. At that time, SL would be allowed de-
preciation according to the temporal allocation of deductions de-
scribed for the ordinary lender.
For example, assume SL originally had paid $3.9 million for the
property, and therefore was entitled to $100,000 depreciation annually
for that investment. If, after holding the property for 15 years, SL
sold it for $1 million cash and a nonrecourse note from the buyer for
196 For example, if B borrowed only $5 of the S10 purchase price and paid the mortgage
in Year 7, straight line depreciation would be allocated to B on the same schedule as if he
had paid all cash.
B L
Year Basis Recovery Basis Recovery
1 $5,000,000 $256,410 S5,000,000 0
2 4,743,590 256,410 5,000,000 0
3 4,487,180 256,410 5,000,000 0
4 4,230,770 256,410 5,000,000 0
5 3,974,360 256,410 5,000,000 0
6 3,717,950 256,410 5,000,000 0
7 8,461,540 256,410 0 0
197 This assumes that the buyer makes some irrevocable commitment to the property,
unlike in Franklin.
198 The realization event under § 1001 is clear, even though the seller probably would
defer most of the gain under § 453.
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$10.7 million,199 the buyer would start with a $1 million depreciable
basis. SL would reduce his $2.4 million basis by the $1 million down-
payment received from the buyer, representing a reduction in SL's
investment in the property. The total basis in the property, $2.4 mil-
lion, would include the unrecovered investments of each-the buyer's
$1 million and SL's $1.4 million. Assuming that the buyer's interest
was subordinate to SL's and no principal payments were made on the
note, the buyer would be entitled to claim all depreciation deductions
going forward, until her $1 million was fully depreciated. 200 At that
time, SL would resume deductions until his $1.4 million interest was
fully depreciated or replaced by the buyer's investment in the
property.
This proposal, particularly with respect to seller-financed transac-
tions in which SL had a low basis at the time of the "sale," would
represent a significant change from current law, and would make
seller-financed nonrecourse debt transactions considerably less attrac-
tive than third party-financed nonrecourse debt transactions. In the
example just described, the pre-"sale" annual depreciation allowance
was $100,000, while the post-"sale" annual depreciation allowance
would be only $61,500. Therefore, the total depreciation allowed with
respect to the property would go down as a result of the "sale." A
comparison with third party financing for the full $11.7 million
purchase price only magnifies the disadvantages of seller financing.20'
This treatment is appropriate, however, because the seller-financed
deal is not like a real sale, and therefore, should not support basis for
the full purchase price, regardless of the allocation of depreciation de-
ductions between the co-investors. Instead, the seller-financed "sale"
described here is more like the formation of a new investment in
property in which the buyer invests $1 million and SL invests $1.4
million. Because of the depreciation already claimed by SL, the total
investment in the property is less at the moment of the sale than it was
when SL first purchased the property for $3.9 million.
If the $11.7 million purchase price was the fair market value of the
property, the greater part of SL's investment in the property would be
in the form of unrecognized appreciation, which should not support
depreciation allowances until it became a tax paid amount. By con-
199 This is a total purchase price of $11.7 million, or three times SL's original purchase
price.
200 Assuming a 39-year recovery period, at the rate of $61,538 per year, the buyer would
be entitled to 16.25 years of depreciation deductions before the seller's interest would be-
gin to waste again.
201 If the acquisition at $11.7 million had been bank financed, the annual depreciation
allowance would have been $300,000 per year, or almost five times as great as the allow-
ance produced by seller financing.
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trast, the third party lender would be entitled to basis because he in-
vested tax-paid amounts in the property. SL is comparable to those
lenders only to the extent that he has tax-paid amounts invested in the
property.20 2 This treatment of the seller-financed transaction there-
fore is consistent with the general model proposed in this Article be-
cause it treats SL just like the third party lender wherever they have
comparable interests. The lower basis on the "sale" in the example is
the result of prior depreciation claimed by SL and the fact that the
seller's appreciation has not yet been taxed.
This treatment of seller-financed transactions would remove the in-
centive to enter into inflated, nonrecourse debt-financed purchases.
Since seller-financed transactions have been identified by some as the
root of the abusive tax shelter,2 03 making these transactions less at-
tractive, without provisions such as §§ 465 and 469, seems desirable.
SL would have gain on the transaction from any payments that
otherwise would reduce his basis below zero.2 04 Until the buyer's in-
vestment completely replaced SL's investment, however, principal
payments would reduce SL's basis in the property. This is consistent
with the view that nonrecourse debt represents an inseparable invest-
ment in the property by the lender, and that SL would continue to
have an investment subject to loss until that investment was extin-
guished. Waiting until the sale was completed to require gain recogni-
tion is consistent with continuing to allow SL to claim depreciation on
his investment even after the buyer acquired an interest in the prop-
erty. Requiring gain recognition prior to complete recovery of basis
would presume that the nonrecourse debt is like true debt. Deferral
of gain recognition recognizes that the buyer might still walk away
from the property without satisfying the obligation.
In the example, if SL received only $1 million from the buyer, he
would have no gain. SL must be taxed, however, to the extent of any
payments representing investment by the buyer that do not replace
investment by SL (that is, amounts in excess of SL's original basis).
These payments show that SL, in fact, will make a profit on the sale of
the property, despite the nonrecourse nature of the debt. By reducing
basis for principal payments, SL essentially depreciates the property
22 Unlike the third party lender situation, seller financing under current law creates
basis from amounts that are not tax-paid. Where there is a third party lender who pro-
duces cash, that cash is a tax-paid amount. While current law allows the borrower to claim
basis credit for the tax-paid amount of the lender, the total depreciation allowed on the
property is supported by tax-paid basis. Such is not the case with nonrecourse seller fi-
nancing. Cf. Cooper, note 134, at 718 (suggesting that sellers should have to recognize gain
attributable to any purchase price for which buyers claim basis).
2m See Shaviro, Risk and Accrual, note 1, at 441; Sims, note 3, at 264-72.
204 This is the open transaction model in Burnet v. Logan, 283 U.S. 404 (1931) (allowing
basis recovery prior to any income inclusion where amount realized was contingent).
Imaged with the Permission of N.Y.U. Tax Law Review
1995]
HeinOnline  -- 51 Tax. L. Rev. 171 1995-1996
TAX LAW REVIEW
to zero, and all succeeding payments from the buyer would be recap-
ture gain.205
Each time the buyer made a further investment in the property, her
depreciable basis would increase, regardless of SL's treatment. As de-
scribed above, the payments from buyer to SL would be characterized
as rent, option premium replacement of SL's investment in the prop-
erty and gain.
C. Revised Analysis of a Restructuring
In a restructuring, modification of a nonrecourse debt would not
affect the securing property. A reduction in the principal amount of
the debt, for example, would simply be recognition that the property
had declined in value and the economic loss had been suffered by the
lender-just as the system proposed here reflects. If, in Example 1, $9
million of debt were restructured when the value of the property had
fallen to $5 million, the borrower had no basis and the lender had a $7
million basis, no adjustment to basis would attend the restructuring.
As the lender depreciated the next $2 million, he would be writing off
a loss that he had suffered economically. 20 6
This approach would allocate the loss correctly as between the two
taxpayers. It also would give the lender a clearer choice between re-
structuring and foreclosing than does current law. A lender who actu-
ally foreclosed, rather than restructured, would be entitled to a loss
equal to the difference between the unrecovered cost (the outstanding
amount of the debt that had not already been depreciated) and the
205 An alternative treatment of SL's gain recognition would apply the contingent
purchase price rules of the installment sale provisions. See Temp. Reg. § 15A.453-1(c).
For purposes of determining gain from each payment, SL would be presumed eventually to
receive the full purchase price. This is a bias towards overtaxation of the seller because the
full purchase price is the maximum that the seller will receive. See note 178 and accompa-
nying text. Although such an approach is necessary under current law to minimize the
opportunities for abuse, I reject it because it treats nonrecourse debt in a manner funda-
mentally contrary to the treatment in this proposal by presuming that the debt is a true
debt that will be fully satisfied by the buyer. It also would generate considerable complex-
ity because the seller could have gain on the original transaction, but then be allowed
further depreciation deductions before satisfaction of the debt, which would require
recomputation of the gross profit percentage. Under current law, the installment sale rules
must reject open transaction treatment because the inclusion of all purchase money debt in
buyer's basis created a win-win situation for buyers and seller-lenders, which promoted tax
avoidance behavior. Because this proposal considerably reduces the tax advantages of
seller financing, the overall incentives to abuse are minimal, despite the seller's open trans-
action treatment.
206 There is a timing gap in a restructuring in that the $7 million basis suggests that there
is still $7 million of value while the restructuring suggests that there is only $5 million. The
proposal requires that the $2 million difference be recovered over time, rather than at the
restructuring. But that is a by-product of maintaining the realization rule and the nature of
any schedular approach to depreciation.
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value of the property, $2 million in this example.207 A lender who
could not wait for the scheduled deductions might choose to foreclose
and trigger realization of loss on the property.
It is appropriate that the tax consequences of a restructuring and a
foreclosure differ because the parties' rights with respect to the opera-
tion and potential appreciation of the property differ depending upon
which course is followed. The lender always can choose foreclosure
over restructuring, forcing a realization event, if the schedule of de-
preciation does not provide deductions soon enough2c0 Under cur-
rent law, a straight-debt restructuring yields COD income to the
borrower, whereas a foreclosure is treated as a sale (at a gain, if the
outstanding debt exceeds the borrower's basis in the collateral). In
case of default, these tax consequences necessarily are factored into
the negotiations between the borrower and lender, and necessarily
will influence the economic outcome of any resulting bargain. The
lender, of course, has all the leverage. My proposal would eliminate
this tax distortion. Since the debt was never credited to the borrower
as an investment, neither a foreclosure nor a restructuring has any tax
effect on the borrower. Since the borrower is tax neutral, if the lender
chooses to restructure, the parties are left to bargain based solely
upon the economic prospects of the property.
D. Conclusion
This proposal to treat nonrecourse debt as an investment by the
lender in securing property grows out of an examination of the nature
of nonrecourse debt, and the observation that all nonrecourse debt
can be characterized correctly as an investment in property by the
lender. Contrary to the Crane Court's belief, nonrecourse debt can-
not always be characterized as true debt. The insistence on treating
nonrecourse debt like true debt has created a system in which income
from transactions in depreciable property is deliberately mis-
measured. The resulting distortions encouraged the proliferation of
abusive tax shelters, but the trouble with the true debt approach did
not disappear with the decline of the individual tax shelter and the
adoption of §§ 465 and 469.
The restructuring analyzed in this Article is but one example of the
abiding inadequacy of the true debt approach, and it shows that the
essential shortcomings of that approach will mean continuing uncer-
tainty and complexity in the law, consequences diametrically opposed
207 $7 - $5 = $2. IRC § 166.
2 Only a true mark-to-market system would prevent the recognition of gain or loss at
this point.
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to the Supreme Court's vision of administrability and certainty. If the
tax law is to continue to evolve in an attempt to measure income more
accurately within the constraints of a realization system, it is appropri-
ate to revisit the fundamental approach to nonrecourse debt and the
depreciation consequences that flow from that approach. Nonre-
course debt needs redefinition in accordance with its substance, which
bears little resemblance to debt at all, but behaves very much like an
ownership interest of the lender in the property that secures the debt.
While the proposal suggested here does not attempt to solve every
problem of taxing debt-financed property transactions, it recognizes
the inconsistencies and difficulties of current law and represents a step
in the direction of better income measurement.
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